“Active Neutrality”Austria and its Diplomatic Ambiguity
Solomon Clarke-Foster
Solomon Clarke-Foster is a third year BA History and German student at University College London
On May 15th 1955, the Austrian government met with representatives of the Allied nations at the Schloss Belvedere. After many years of discourse and diplomatic engagements, an agreement had finally been reached: The Allied signatories and the Austrian administration signed the Austrian State Treaty, confirming the state’s future role as a neutral nation in the very centre of Europe (Judt, 2005). And yet, the precise details of Austria’s neutrality in practical terms remained hotly debated, as post war economic and military frameworks began to evolve and grow around Austria. Naturally, many leading figures of Austrian politics looked towards Switzerland and Sweden as feasible models of neutrality, calling for a more detailed definition of the state’s diplomatic position (Gehler, 2001).
Bruno Kreisky, originally involved in setting up the Austrian State Treaty, played perhaps the most pivotal role in shaping neutral Austria’s diplomatic navigation of the Cold War and other global conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. His policy of ‘active neutrality’, which elevated Austria’s status from passive bystander to active mediator on the global diplomatic stage, helped Austria grow both its reputation and its economy. In an article written by Kreisky in 1958, he argued that neutral states would cease to exist if they were “ideologically indifferent”, instead proposing to “attempt to gain the trust of both potential global powers” (Kreisky, 1958). Following Russian aggression in Ukraine, Austrian neutrality has once again come under the spotlight. As Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, Austria remains the only neutral EU member state in continental Europe, poised between neutrality and active participation. Was Bruno Kreisky correct in his assessment of ‘active neutrality’ (aktive Neutralitätspolitik) as being the only viable way to uphold a neutral state and has Austria’s recent diplomatic ambiguity left it open to undue influence?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed crucial interdependencies between European states and Russia. The steady Russian oil and gas supply and significant investments in different sectors of national industries slowed due to economic sanctions, exposing Germany and Austria as the two most dependent EU states. Austria had, for many years, sought closer ties to Russia than many of its counterparts, most publicly when the former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl invited Vladimir Putin to her wedding in 2018 (Spiegel, 2022). Causing widespread outrage, the intertwined nature of the Russian and Austrian political elite became visible to the public eye. Kneissl later moved to Russia, receiving a well-paid position at Rosneft, alongside Putin’s wedding gift of diamond earrings, reportedly valued at around 50,000 Euros (Kurier, 2021). Although perhaps one of the most embarrassing and high-profile examples of Russia’s connection to Austria, it showed a clear lack of diplomatic nuance, evident in many of Austria’s decisions over the past decade. The infamous Ibiza-gate scandal, whereby the leader of the far-right FPÖ attempted to sell Austria’s largest newspaper to what he assumed was the niece of an oligarch, later turning out to be a sting operation to catch them in the act, illustrated just how deeply entrenched Russian influence had become in Austria.
While the two aforementioned cases had an impact on domestic policy, they did not necessarily impact Europe outside of Austria’s borders. In contrast, however, in 2022 the state’s openness to Russian influence had a broader impact. After the EU compiled a list of oligarchs in order to place economic sanctions on them, one of the names previously on the list was mysteriously crossed off. Oleg Derispaska’s name, formerly the richest man in Russia and a major shareholder in a Russian armaments supplier, curiously was nowhere to be found. Reports soon came to light that claimed a small EU state had protected the oligarch from sanctions. Given Deripaska’s close ties to Austrian industry, including a major stake in the largest construction company in Austria, it is considered highly probable that the nation was the small EU state offering him protection. After widespread public outrage, to which the Austrian government had responded with repeated denial of the claims, Deripaska’s name was soon placed back on the list of EU sanctioned oligarchs (Gepp, 2023).
Alongside the Deripaska case, another notable incident further shows how deeply Russian control has penetrated, not just the economy, but Austria’s institutions. Jan Marsalek, former COO of disgraced Wirecard, fled the EU in 2020, escaping to Russia. After thorough investigation, reports now suggest he had been leading a double life, as a Russian agent and as a businessman. In his role as a Russian agent he established connections in the Austrian government and its institutions, offering financial incentives in exchange for information which he then reported back to Russia (Der Spiegel, 2024). In fact, his influence reached as far as the Austrian secret service, members of which he managed to recruit, gaining crucial information from them in exchange for money. This not only included portfolios which the Austrian secret service had amassed, but also confidential documents, such as the formula for the Russian nerve agent Novichok, from other secret services (Der Standard, 2020). Subsequently, the Austrian secret service was disbanded and reconstituted, but other states’ intelligence agencies still refuse to cooperate with Austria in fear of a similar incident occurring once more.
The current situation Austria faces, regularly open to undue influence from Russia and simultaneously voicing its concurrence with EU criticisms is a far cry from Bruno Kreisky and his policy of neutrality. The Austrian chancellor’s idea of ‘active neutrality’ in the 1970s was instrumental in shaping the state’s steadfast diplomatic decisions (Brunner, 2020). Conducting regular meetings and state visits in both the USA and the Soviet Union, Kreisky shaped Austria into a mediator and unofficial communication channel between the two. The Vienna International Centre (VIC), built from 1973-79, home to the UN Vienna offices, OSCE and OPEC to name a few, is evidence of the successful diplomatic positioning undertaken by Kreisky’s administration (Wolfgang Mueller, 2011).
Austrian ‘active neutrality’ did not stop at US-Soviet relations. Bruno Kreisky believed in acting as a communication channel for other nations. Among other things, he led the discourse on peacefully resolving the Israel-Palestine question, arguing that a fact-finding mission was necessary in order to establish whether or not peace could be achieved by creating an independent Palestinian state. Peace missions in the Middle East continued under his watch, as states in the region were more open to discussion with a nation that had no relevant colonial past and posed no military threat (Harrer, 2023). In 1979 Kreisky became the first Western leader to meet PLO leader Yasser Arafat, with whom he extensively discussed the possibility of a two-state solution. Despite drawing criticism from many sides, in part due to his own Jewish heritage, he attempted to set up an open dialogue between Israel and Palestine (Christoph Kotanko, 2020). In an interview five years after his resignation as chancellor, Bruno Kreisky criticised the apparent foreign policy shift, as Austria no longer openly advocated for a two-state solution, instead remaining decidedly silent on matters in the Middle East (Bruno Kreisky, 1988). This diplomatic ambiguity is still noticeable today, as Austria defaults to Germany’s decisions whenever foreign affairs are in the spotlight.
Naturally, the global diplomatic stage has changed greatly from the late Cold War period. Among other things, Leonid Brezhnev’s incomparability to Vladimir Putin, Austria’s membership in the European Union, the changing geopolitical state of Central and Eastern Europe and the recent widespread conflict in the Middle East have all impacted the role of Austria. Mediation has largely become a task of transnational frameworks, not of single actors and the complexity of international diplomacy places a return to Bruno Kreisky’s policy of ‘active neutrality’ out of reach. The discussion surrounding Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession have also revealed the unsteady nature of Austria’s own neutrality, prompting debate on whether or not to follow in their footsteps.
Recent incidents have shown that Austria’s ambiguity in the face of diplomatic decisions is incompatible with the state’s neutrality. Growing Russian influence in Austria indicates the republic is no longer capable of the nuanced mediation which was previously key to the state’s impartiality. To a certain extent, Bruno Kreisky was correct in his early assessment regarding the risks of being “ideologically indifferent”, yet it is also worth noting that changes on the global diplomatic stage would make ‘active neutrality’, as formulated by the chancellor, impossible to implement. However, the apathy surrounding debates on Austria’s diplomatic role will only further harm its position as a neutral state, leaving the republic open to corruption and outside influence. Reassessing the state’s neutrality and defining a future path for navigating international conflicts is crucial to preventing Austria from becoming ever more vulnerable to foreign actors.
