Cooling relations and melting icebergs: the changing geopolitics of the Arctic

Tallulah Richards is a third year History student, primarily focusing on the history of Latin America and the Soviet Union in Cold War contexts.

Introduction

In a speech made to the US House of Representatives in July 2023, American foreign policy expert Ester Brimmer, highlighted the growing strategic importance of the Arctic region, identifying the region as a location of great power competition with strategic and commercial rivalry intensifying following the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. This exploration of strategic realignment amidst the shifting landscape of superpower relationships and alliances provides an interesting glimpse to the effects of the changing dynamic of geopolitics and diplomacy and how this converges of parts of the globe that have been previously considered as spaces unaffected by issues of security. This article will survey the current landscape, two years after the Invasion – clarifying how relations between the Arctic countries are structured and how this has been altered by global developments. 

Breakdown of multilateral cooperation

Once heralded a bastion of global cooperation, the collaboration between the ‘Arctic Five’ and the organisation of the Arctic Council was indicative of successful multilateral forums and solutions, the Council being nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize and instituting vital climate protection treaties. The Ilulissat Declaration in 2008 was vital in establishing a framework for addressing environmental issues that affect the Arctic, but also clarified defensive security measures, with the participating nations agreeing to protect the region from undue foreign influence. Joint action over issues of sustainability and natural resources has faltered significantly since 2022 and the Arctic Council’s decision to cease their collaboration with Russia. This is in line with the general challenges facing multilateralism worldwide, the OSCE chairman Ian Borg highlighting that the war of aggression against Ukraine ‘serves as a dark reminder of the trials our multilateral system faces[1]’[1].Whilst relations between NATO and Russia were by no means plain sailing from the formation of the Council in 1996 and the present day, managing to withstand Russian encroachment in Georgia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014 respectively and the Baltics joining the NATO bloc, new developments have dismantled Arctic harmony and cooperation. Russia accounts for nearly half the Arctic’s population, dominating its industry and geographically representing over half of the Arctic’s coastline. This transcontinental country is a vital part of the Arctic, and vice versa, the Arctic is an important part of Russia [2]. The nation’s Arctic policy is arguably driven by retaining its resources and trading routes but also securing its strategic military second-strike capabilities in the Kola Peninsula [3]. Therefore, the impact of Russian domestic and international policy, including its relations with NATO, touchdown in the region and provide an indication of global geopolitical trends. Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson argues that the Arctic has been the “perennial next great-power flash point” and to observe this perspective, it is required to explore the contemporary circumstances that engenders this analysis[2]. Namely, climate instability, the multinational scramble for resources and conflict spillover from the Russia-Ukraine War. The breakdown of multilateral organisations that oversee the arctic such as the Arctic Council following the 2022 invasion conveys the direct impact that global tensions have on the future of governance in the region, raising the question of the potential role of the Arctic in the years to come. 

The nature of tensions in the region since 2022

With the heightened tension between Russia and NATO countries since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including the intensification of hybrid threats and rhetoric, this dynamic can be seen as impacting the Arctic region in several different ways. Firstly, it leading to the expansion of NATO, with the Nordic countries of Sweden and Finland renegotiating their neutral status. As a result, the Arctic now lacks the neutrality of the two nations, creating a political dynamic of two opposing ‘camps’ that exacerbates polarity and renders Arctic diplomacy in an unfit position to function. Western economic sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine have necessitated investment, which has allowed increased Chinese money and involvement in the region, alongside a closer Sino-Russian strategic alliance. Brimmer reported that 90 billion dollars have been invested in Russian sections of the Arctic by China over the last decade, as a part of China’s ‘Polar Silk Road initiative’ that aims to gain a foothold in the region for economic, trade and commercial interests. Such as the ability to reap the awards of the untapped oil and gas reserves and shipping routes that are being opened due to the melting ice caps [4]. With reporting of the US military’s interception of Russian and Chinese bombers over Alaska in July of this year, the reality of the Sino-Russian alliance on the Arctic frontier is increasingly clarified to the West. These concerns are demonstrated in policy documents, as evidenced in the first US Arctic strategy document since 2013, which highlights the ‘new risks of unintended conflict’ and underscores the offensive nature of Russian goals, with reference to hybrid warfare such as sabotage of oil and gas undersea cables [5].

The Zero-Sum Game: strategic competition and militarisation 

Russian government ministers have also recently signalled that military bases are intended to be established by Arctic NATO borders, as shown by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stating that “Given NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia [6].”This region is therefore demonstrated to be susceptible to issues of security and strategic competition and the further heightening of tensions between Russia and NATO countries. The US and NATO are also engaging in moves to preserve their influence, the United States perceiving the Arctic as its ‘fourth coast’ and a strategic interest to be protected [7]. The summer of 2024 has seen multiple incidents of airspace violations and bomber exercises of the Arctic, from both the US and Russia, with a NATO source telling Reuters that incidences of NATO jets being scrambled in order to intercept Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea region increased at least 20% in the first quarter of 2024[8]. Moreover, in October 2024 Sweden released a defence document which highlights it’s concerns over Russia’s proliferation of military equipment and its perceived increased capacity to take political and military risks, justifying the additional 170 billion kroner the Swedes are investing to its defence budget primarily in sub-arctic warfare [9]. This illustrates the deepening nature of the conflict, with tensions reaching the point at which military apparatus is engaged. Also evident is the increasing NATO activity in the form of closer strategic relations and alliances. The organisation can be seen to be concerned by Sino/Russian forays into the region with the creation of the ICE Pact at the NATO summit in Washington this summer - the US, Finland and Canada agreeing to collaborate to build fleets of icebreaking vessels. With limited resources and territory, there is a zero-sum game. Ever-increasing competition is leading to greater militarisation of the region, evoking the Cold War era and how the creation of NORAD in 1958 solidified the Arctic as a strategic and military front. 

The precarious dynamic signals a return to the era of militarisation in the Arctic, with the breakdown of multilateral cooperation due to the Russia-Ukraine War and greater strategic competition caused by growing Chinese influence in the region and intensified struggle for resources and territory. The breakdown of Arctic Council relations further escalates the situation, with the region’s lack of international legal protections meaning that diplomacy is vital in policymaking and peacekeeping [9]. Without the Council’s cooperative nature, the Arctic feels the effects of, and catalyses heightened global tensions, serving as an important proxy for competition. As we anticipate the change in US policy direction, towards both NATO and the issue of climate change, the Arctic will undoubtedly become a central theatre amidst the new geopolitical landscape. 

Works cited

[1] Ukraine war ‘stark reminder’ of the trials facing multilateralism (2024) UN News. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148756 (Accessed: 14 November 2024).

[2] Ellyatt, H. (2019) Russia is dominating the Arctic, but it’s not looking to fight over it, CNBC. CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/27/russias-dominance-in-the-arctic.html.

[3] Rumer, E., Sokolsky, R. and Stronski, P. (2021) Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination, carnegieendowment.org. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/03/russia-in-the-arctica-critical-examination?lang=en.

[4] Sharma, A. (2021) ‘China’s Polar Silk Road: Implications for the Arctic Region’, Air University (AU), 25 October. Available at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2820750/chinas-polar-silk-road-implications-for-the-arctic-region/.

[5] Wall, C. and Wegge, N. (2023) ‘The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War’, www.csis.org. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war.

[6] Nilssen, T. (2022) Shoigu vows more troops near Nordic countries, Thebarentsobserver.com, The Barents Observer. Available at: https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/shoigu-vows-more-troops-near-nordic-countries/163082 (Accessed: 14 November 2024).

[7] Allen, T.W. et al. (2017) Arctic Imperatives, Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/report/arctic-imperatives.

[8] Russia says its fighter jets intercepted 2 U.S. strategic bombers in the Arctic (2024) Cbsnews.com. CBS News. Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-fighter-jets-intercept-us-b-52h-bombers-barents-sea-arctic/ (Accessed: 14 November 2024).

[9] Gross, M. (2020) Geopolitical Competition in The Arctic Circle, Harvard International Review. Available at: https://hir.harvard.edu/the-arctic-circle/.