Growing Tension in Korean Peninsula
Adelaide Im is a first year Philosophy, Politics and Economics student at UCL with an interest in international relations and security. (email : elfland117@gmail.com)
Some borders between states are arbitrary. The 38th parallel which divides the Korean peninsula into the DPRK and the ROK is a good example of this. Despite being successfully ruled under a single government since 1392, after being colonised by the Empire of Japan from 1910 to 1945, the USSR and the USA each took control of the Northern and Southern part of the peninsula. The extended cold war between the USSR and the USA denied the establishment of a unified state and instead, subjected the two regions to an ideological conflict. The 38th parallel, therefore, is not a result of ideological and ethnic differences but a cause of it, which makes intense hostility and conflict that would be discussed further later rather absurd.
A historical context of the relationship between North and South Korea
In 1950, with support provided by the USSR and China, the DPRK invaded the ROK which received support from the USA. After yielding deaths of 3 million people (Imperial War Museums, 2018), in 1953, an Armistice Agreement was signed and separate states of ‘The Republic of Korea’(South Korea) and ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ were established. A few attempts towards peaceful discourse took place but but little progress was made until Taewoo Roh’s government which held authority in ROK from 1988 to 1993.
Under the policy of ‘Nordpolitik’, Roh has embarked on diplomatic approaches to the DPRK within inter-Korean trade and sports exchanges. In 1991, a basic agreement on “reconciliation, nonaggression, exchange and cooperation” was signed between the two states which later led to a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. After a fluctuating phase of the relationship during Youngsam Kim’s term as the president of the ROK, Daejung Kim was elected next to pursue the ‘Sunshine Policy’. Along with his proactive and friendly diplomatic approach towards the DPRK, he facilitated the provision of fertiliser and food aid. A presidential summit in Pyeongyang was also held for the first time since division. Despite such efforts, including the development of the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex, naval clashes in 1999 and 2002 followed by the abrogation of an agreed framework on the DPRK’s nuclear weapon programme between the USA and the DPRK increased tension in the peninsula.
The next president of the ROK, Moohyun Roh, continued the pursuit of a peaceful relationship with the DRPK by increasing bilateral and humanitarian aid to the DPRK with a considerable amount of investment in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). However, these efforts were cut short and suspended in light of the DPRK’s nuclear tests. Although a second inter-Korean Summit was held in 2007, the projects discussed were not implemented by the ROK’s government.
Moving onto a relatively recent period, ROK’s president Myung-bak Lee promised the DPRK a $3,000 per capita income in 10 years if it abandoned its nuclear development while calling out the human rights issue in the DPRK. Nevertheless, after an ROK tourist was shot in the DPRK by a soldier and refused a joint investigation, the DPRK announced that all the past agreements with the ROK are now invalidated. Tensions due to continued nuclear and missile tests peaked when armed conflicts took place twice in the islands of the ROK which resulted in the death of 50 ROK soldiers and citizens in total. Apologies were not given from DRPK despite the request.
Under Geunhye Park’s administration, the DPRK has expressed hostility towards the ROK and the USA’s joint military exercises that were in response to its nuclear tests. When the DPRK launched its fourth nuclear test, the KIC was closed and the ROK imposed sanctions and harsher security policies against the DPRK. Subsequently, Jae-in Moon did succeed in holding another peaceful summit in the ROK, however, in 2017, the DPRK conducted multiple missile tests and its relationship with the USA worsened with Trump’s threats toward the Kim regime. The outbreak of COVID-19 also led to an extended isolation of the DPRK, further hindering communication and reconciliation.
Currently, after Sukyeol Yoon was elected as the new president of the ROK, the DPRK has drastically increased the frequency of missile tests and Yoon responded to this by prioritizing defence over reconciliation with the DPRK[9].
Observing the dynamics of the relationship between the DPRK and the ROK throughout history, some patterns could be seen, Firstly, the DPRK seems to be greatly threatened and triggered by the USA and the ROK’s joint military exercises and tends to respond with nuclear and missile tests. This seems to be causing a vicious cycle as the uncertainty of the motives behind such exercises to strengthen the military power of the ROK may motivate the DPRK to assert its dominance. The DPRK would usually announce how powerful its missiles are – for example, in 2023, it broadcasted that “it tested a new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile - its "most powerful" missile to date.”[8]. Doing so would be widely broadcasted in the ROK, raising hostility towards the DPRK and a sense of fear which could again lead to joint military exercises and sanctions by the USA and ROK. Secondly, the DPRK seems to be sensitive to its violation of human rights within the state being investigated and exposed by the ROK. For instance, it published a report criticising the ROK’s situation of human rights, pointing it as the worst in the world, following the ROK’s publication of an annual report on human rights issues in the DPRK [4]. Lastly, inter-Korean dynamics are extremely volatile and efforts towards reconciliation do not tend to last no matter how much time and money was spent, despite being temporally practical. Both states tend to be easily triggered by each other, leading to swift shifts in diplomatic approaches.
Recent Increase in Tension in the Korean Peninsula
Recently, in October, large-scale reports of the DPRK’s threatening moves in the ROK created a sense of fear among the public. It first began with the news that the DPRK had bombed the Military Demarcation Line on the road between the two states followed by the installation of a barrier as a part of its fortification work. The DPRK has announced that the construction will completely cut off roads and railways that are connected to the ROK and fortify them with solid defensive structures [3]. After such a media report, which effectively heightened fear due to the practical use of physical, explosive weapons, Kim declared that inter-Korean relations are now “between two hostile countries and two belligerents at war”. This soon led to the modification in the constitution of the DPRK to designate the ROK as the “principal enemy” [7]. However, considering the fact that this began as early as last December in 2023 it could be said that there are complex motives behind the timing of the ROK’s press releases.
After claiming that the ROK has dispatched drones over Pyeongyang and threatening that this would be the “last straw” for the DPRK followed by South Korea’s military, it was broadcasted that the DPRK has sent its troops to Russia to assist its war with Ukraine. Most recently, on the 30th of October, it was reported that the DPRK’s troops are already inside Ukraine and that the number of them is expected to increase over time as they would await deployment on the frontline after completing training in Russia [1].
Now, several scenarios could possibly explain the motive behind this. One could be that the DPRK may be aiming to improve its military strength by providing the troops with experience at an actual battlefield as part of a military drill. However, some authorities have suggested that they could be “mere cannon fodder” as the soldiers seem to be very young and inexperienced.
Another could be that the DPRK expects Russia to return the favour. in the future in a situation of conflict. It could be said that such a motive cannot sufficiently justify the the DPRK’s participation under the context of its ongoing poverty and a crashing economy that has been further exacerbated by the pandemic and sanctions. It could be said that to pose a threat to international security at this stage is certainly inappropriate. The same criticism could be raised for the last hypothetical scenario in which the DPRK aims to threaten countries that are on the other ideological side such as NATO and the ROK.
Which scenario is the actual motive of the DPRK could never be verified unless it is officially declared, but it seems to be sure that this would now change the aspect of the war significantly by expanding the scope of states involved.
The inter-Korean relations have always been fluctuating. One important issue to focus on would be the upcoming election in which Trump, who has taken a friendly stance about Putin and Russia, holds a considerable possibility of being elected as the president of the USA. This could be supported by three pieces of evidence firstly, “The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and the Senate Intelligence Committee” confirmed that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to help Trump. Secondly, Trump has taken a stance that attacks NATO and poses doubt to the USA’s democratic system, which would align with Putin's aims to weaken the alliance. Lastly, during his last tenure, he seemed reluctant to sign sanctions towards Russia [2]. In light of the increased volatility of international affairs, it would be wise for the ROK to tone down their provocation toward the DPRK or provide it with justification for further threats, but rather approach the situation strategically and calmly.
Works Cited
[1] Bertrand, N. 2024, Small number of North Korean troops are already inside Ukraine, officials say, CNN, 29 October. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/29/politics/north-korean-troops-ukraine/index.html. [30 October 2024].
[2] Cohen, M. 2020, 37 times Trump was soft on Russia, CNN, 4 August. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/17/politics/trump-soft-on-russia/index.html.
[3] BBC News Korea 2024, 북한 “남측 연결 도로·철도 완전 끊고 요새화 공사” 선언, BBC News Korea, 9 October. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c981q76rrz1o. [30 October 2024].
[4] BBC News Korea 2023, 북한, 한국 겨냥 인권보고서 발간... “세계 최악의 인권불모지”, BBC News Korea, 31 July. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/clj55g13j1do. [30 October 2024].
[5] Imperial War Museums 2018, A short history of the Korean War, Imperial War Museums. Available from: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/a-short-history-of-the-korean-war.
[6] Murphy, M. 2024, Ukraine war: NATO says North Korean troops deployed to Russia’s Kursk region, BBC News, 28 October. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cyv737vy376o.
[7] Ng, K. 2024, North Korea’s constitution now calls the South “hostile state”, BBC News, 17 October. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1wnxlxxwq2o.
[8] Ng, K. & Mackenzie, J. 2023, North Korea says it tested “most powerful” missile to date, BBC News, 14 April. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-65271835.
[9] Wertz, D. 2023, Inter-Korean relations, The National Committee on North Korea, September. Available from: https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/inter-korean-relations.
