Oct 196 min read

HONG KONG: Democracy or Dictatorship?

Hong Kong may never have been a fully-fledged democracy in the Western sense, but it certainly was not a dictatorship. In 1997, as a former British Crown colony, it was handed over to China, becoming a ‘special administrative region’ under the ‘one

country, two systems’ principle. In accordance with the Basic Law, a quasi-constitution designed to last until 2047, a number of rights, safeguards and freedoms were guaranteed to Hong Kong. Among those freedoms were those of assembly, speech and media; those rights included universal suffrage, with notable safeguards such as a system of common law, independence of the judiciary, election of the chief executive, and the preservation of the capitalist system. However, many of these rights and privileges have been eroded over time, especially since 2019, when China started to tighten its grip over the region through the promotion of ‘patriots’ and repression of pro-democracy figures and traditions.22

政暴有只徒暴有沒‘There are no rioters, only a tyrannical regime’ (31 August 2019)

In the recent past, there have been numerous pieces of legislation by the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities which highlight this erosion of democratic practices. A key development was the passing of the National Security Law, coming into effect on 30th June 2020, after having been passed by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. Although the Basic Law states that no Chinese laws can be promulgated in Hong Kong, a cunning use of the Annex III section permitted the legislation to be implemented by decree, thereby bypassing the Hong Kong legislature. This 66-article act handed the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities an effective instrument with which to criminalise pro-democracy activists, media outlets, and politicians. The law covers a range of areas, from authorising China to open a security outpost in Hong Kong to being able to reinterpret the law at their discretion. Furthermore, the law involves various judicial encroachments, including closed trials, and provides the chief executive with the authority to preside over them. The decree also infringes on privacy through general surveillance including the arbitrary wire- tapping of suspects. Significantly, this measure carries the threat of life-imprisonment and the prohibition to stand for public office, an effective tool against pro-democracy politicians. Labelled by ex-US Secretary of State Pompeo as the ‘death knell’ of democratic freedoms, this unilateral Chinese action has been no empty threat. For example, this year, the National Security Law provided the pretext for the arrest of the leaders of Hong Kong’s annual Tiananmen vigil, with their company being removed from the official registry and the museum centred on the event being pillaged by law enforcement. As of October 2021, over hundred individuals have been arrested through this legislation. Additionally, the law has been utilised to suppress the media, most significantly the Apple Daily newspaper, through the arrest of founder Jimmy Lai and

others and the freezing 18 million HK$ of the organisation’s assets, leading to its closure. A ‘key institution of Hong Kong society’, according to university lecturer Lokman Tsui, the shutting down of the largest pro-democracy publication by circulation in June 2021, represents a symbolic and real blow to democracy in Hong Kong. Overall, this evidence highlights how extraneous legislation has proven fatal to many democratic elements in Hong Kong, from the suppression of media to the imprisonment of pro-democracy activists and politicians, infringing on numerous democratic freedoms including freedom of speech, assembly and speech.

可不一缺求訴大五‘Five demands, not one less’ (12 August 2019)

1.Withdrawal of extradition bill 2.Independent inquiry into police misconduct 3.Withdraw the term ‘riot’ to depict protests 4.Immunity for protesters5. Full democracy

The second recent frontal attack on democracy involved the alterations made to the Hong Kong electoral system, endorsed by the National People’s Congress on 11th March 2021 as the ‘Patriots governing Hong Kong’ resolution. The move was pre- emptively described by US State Department spokesman Ned Price as ‘a direct attack on Hong Kong’s autonomy, Hong Kong’s freedoms and the democratic processes.’ The repression on representation is clearly characterised by the reduction in the voter base eligible from 233,000 to 4800, only 0.06% of the total population. Additionally, only a fraction of the 90 seats will be subject to direct election in December 2021, decreasing from 35 to 20. The other seats are to be chosen by an Election Committee (40 seats) and by business leaders (30 seats). Moreover, the process now involves a vetting system, with

no pro-democracy candidates having been declared as of late October, spelling an inevitable ‘patriot’ victory. Furthermore, such a change seems to be irreversible, with Professor Lee Jonghyuk emphasising that ‘universal suffrage is a mere obstacle to the stability of the Communist Party’s regime.’ However, it is not only the direct effect on representation, but the impacts on other democratic freedoms and democratic spirit must also be considered. As Jonghyuk has argued, the measures ‘will destroy social trust among citizens by incentivising more people on the street to report criticism to the government.’ Overall, therefore, as per Lord Chris Patten, the former British governor of Hong Kong, the measures represent ‘the biggest step so far to obliterate Hong Kong’s freedoms and aspirations for greater democracy under the rule of law.’

命革代時港香復光‘Restore Hong Kong, revolution of our times’ (18 August 2019)

However, the West has not been silent. For instance, in February 2021, UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab strongly condemned the exploitation of the National Security Law to find 47 Hong Kong politicians guilty of ‘subversion,’ arguing that it further violated the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. Additionally, the West has not limited itself to verbal disapproval. Notably, in 2020, the UK suspended its extradition treaty with Hong Kong in response to the National Security Law due to the fear that the accused could be transferred to China. More significantly, on 31st January 2021, the UK increased access to the British National Overseas (BNO) status to Hong Kong residents born before 1997, with an eligibility pool of 2.9 million and a further 2.3 million dependents, consequently providing an evacuation and resettlement option for many. According to estimates, immigration to the UK, through this policy, is expected to amount to between 258,000 to 322,400 Hong Kong citizens over 5 years, highlighting its large potential impact. The UK also approved the entry of 7,000 BNO status holders and dependents through the discretionary Leave Outside the Immigration Rules

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(LOTR) provision between 15th July 2020 and 13th January 2021, providing immediate refuge. Further minor countermeasures include the cessation of training of the Hong Kong Police Force in August 2020.

The US has also implemented reasonably strong countermeasures alongside its frequent verbal condemnations, predominantly through the traditional mechanism of sanctions and multiple acts of Congress. These include the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (2019) and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (July 2020), the latter necessitating sanctions on Chinese individuals and organisations involved in the repression of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Such sanctions have been implemented since then, most recently in July 2021, on this occasion targeting seven Chinese officials; sanctions on Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam and members of the Hong Kong Police Force had already been imposed.

油加人港香,‘Hong Kongers, add oil’

(27 July 2019)

However, generally, the West has been criticised for its lacklustre response to the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong. Firstly, many in the UK have criticised the Government’s settlement scheme, quoting the figures that only 20% of BNO visa applications from February and March had been authorised by August 2021. Apart from administrative complications, charities and NGOs have raised the criticisms that, despite the £43 million support, integration programme and ‘12 virtual welcome hubs’, the UK Government has failed to support recent migrants with accommodation, employment and education. However, most importantly, as Steve Tsang, director of the

SOAS China Institute, has pointed out, ‘sanctuary schemes give people a way out, but they can’t actually change the politics in Hong Kong.’ Similarly, the US measures have been dismissed as symbolic rather than effective. For example, the measures only target certain individuals and companies who are able to circumvent or mitigate the restrictions. All these criticisms highlight the broader obstacle of a lack of real power of the West in Hong Kong. According to Walter Lohman, director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Centre, ‘protesters in Hong Kong [n]ever understood the limited impact American power could have on Beijing’s calculations.’ Overall, the economic desirability of continued trade with China has very much shelved the Hong Kong issue for the time being.

Consequently, although the democratic flame, embodied by the pro-democratic victory in local elections in late 2019, is far from extinguished and further repression is likely. After all, as the Chinese chargé d’affaires in London, Yang Xiaoguang, has pointed out, the UK and China simply have a ‘different definition’ of democracy. The only potential method of instilling a more traditional liberal conception of democracy into Hong Kong would be substantial co-ordinated multilateral legal and economic sanctions, including the US, EU and UK, within a broader long-term strategy. However, in the context of the pandemic and economic uncertainty, and with the potentially devastating economic consequences of Chinese retaliation, such action is becoming increasingly unlikely.