How the European Union securitised the 2015 Syrian Migrant ‘Crisis’.
Ghalia Y. Burgan is completing an MSc. in International Public Policy. She worked with the Arkbound Foundation, the UK’s only NGO concerned with diversity and inclusivity within the world of publishing.
Security discourses continue to dominate the European Union’s (EU) socio-political debates encircling migration. The EU’s recent political agenda is embodied within – and characterised by – the “migration-security nexus” (Panebianco, 2020, p.1398). This security-nexus was materialised through the EU’s confrontation with the Syrian migrant crisis (2015). Throughout the crisis’ development, academics considered the interplay between migration and security (Léonard, 2022, p.1417). This interplay highlights the EU’s successful securitisation of the crisis, and the strategies disseminated to “socially construct” it as a “security issue” (Kaunert, 2022, p.1418). The construction of Syrian migrants into a security issue is materialised through securitisation, operating under the sentiment that there are no “objective security issues that exist”, there are only issues “socially constructed as security threats”, through the framework of securitisation (Buzan, Waver and Wilde, 1998, p.26).
Conceptual Framework of Securitisation:
To explore the migration-security nexus, securitisation ought to be considered, as it represents an internal crisis for the EU. Tamirace Fakhoury meticulously explains the interplay between “securitiser” and “securitised”, discussing the securitiser’s role in constructing issues into threats, “through speech acts and practices”, and the audiences’ role in internalising the issue, rendering the securitisation initiative, “successful” (Fakhoury, 2016, p.69). Securitisation evolved into a “powerful explanatory framework”, aiding, and abetting the understanding of how security is a “performative, and intersubjective process” between the securitiser, and audience. Securitisation is emblematic in establishing the bridge between migration and security, where migration within the EU evolved into a “highly politicised issue”, framed through security considerations, where portraying migrants as “security threats” progressed as the normative depiction (Panebianco, 2020, p.1398). Ole Waever meticulously suggests that within a successful securitisation process, “speech acts” by the securitiser, presents the issue as an “existential threat” to the survival of the ‘referent object’ (Waver, 2002, p.9).
The Rhetorical Discourse: A Successful Securitisation Strategy:
An Overview of Rhetorical Significance:
To consider the EU’s successful securitisation of the Syrian migrant crisis, rhetoric’s role is invaluable, as securitisation is enabled through articulating associations between migrants and security threats (Amelina, 2020, p.5). Rhetoric was successfully delivered to audiences, as media outlets echoed exclusionary discourses of European politicians, further contributing to the reproduction of stereotypes, prejudices, and outpour of normalised racism (Fotopoulos, 2016, p.66). The interplay between European politicians and media outlets was enhanced through promoting “moral panic” fostering a collective sense of fear, furthering the migration–security linkage (Gero, 2020, p.41).
Migrants: “The Threat to EU Identity and Security” Discourse:
The initial portrayal of the crisis was delivered to audiences through rhetoric, characterising migrants as threats to EU security and identity (Martins, 2022, p.1430). For audiences to be receptive towards the rhetoric, EU politicians and media drew upon a facet of securitisation, “extreme politicisation”, to present Syrian migration as an urgent security threat in need of immediate action (Léonard, 2010, p.231). The politicisation of migrants encourages fostering “crisification”, skewing migrants within an emergency frame (Attinà, 2018, p.50). Stefania Panebianco meticulously discusses the interplay between politicisation and securitisation, arguing the two-work hand-in-hand, in a “mutual reinforcing relation” whereby the former sustains the latter and vice-versa (Panebianco, 2020, p.1407). European political parties share resentment towards migration, characterised by a “hard-line” with adamant displays of opposition towards their entry, in “firm defence of state sovereignty”. These sentiments are enabled by right-wing populist parties, namely, Britain’s UKIP, Italy’s Lega, and Hungary’s Fidez party, echoing a discourse enacted with “extremism, intolerance, and xenophobia” (ibid, p.1401). European governments presented Syrian migrants as “threats to national cohesion, culture, and welfare” (Balzaq, 2016, p.495). Within this discourse, political parties posed the “Muslim Question”, whereby Muslim communities were charged with bearing social ills, of “threats to national security and identity” through supposed ‘self-segregation’ (Abbas, 2019, p.2453). Consequently, within such political discursive debates, migrants were “re-figured” as potential terrorists “surreptitiously infiltrating Europe’s space”, and potential criminals “corroding the social and moral fabric of Europe from within”. The “potential terrorist” in question, represents Europe’s “constitutive outside”, whereby the acceptance of the “terrorist” would threaten the fundamental meaning of Europeanness (ibid, p.2453). The rhetoric employed to securitise Syrian migrants, draws upon previous rhetorical remarks made towards Muslim migrants already present within Europe. This is correspondingly conveyed through Theo Goldberg’s sentiments, arguing “the Muslim in Europe”, has come to represent the “threat of violent death”, reinforcing the racialised conception of “could be terrorists” (Goldberg, 2006, p.345). Such conceptions rely upon established stereotypes, re-worked to fit contemporary treatments of Syrian migrants, and Middle Eastern migrants at large, invoking the “dangerousness of the migrant” trope (Abbas, 2019, p.2457).
“Othering” and Dehumanisation:
Alongside the characterisation of Syrian migrants as threats to EU security and identity, the consistent “othering” and the dehumanising rhetoric, played a crucial role in successfully securitising the 2015 Syrian migrant crisis. The dehumanisation of Syrian migrants was emblematised when European governments viewed migrants as “bodies to be diverted” rather than individuals with agency, “in need of protection” (Sperling, 2019, p.229). This virulent reference is wielded within European socio-politics, under the erroneous, socially constructed idea that “we are human, and ‘others’ are not” (Martínez, 2018, p.216). The aforementioned sentiment essentially echoes the “delegitimization of the other”, through the use of divisive terms, “us and them”, in turn generating exclusion, and refiguring the perception of migrants to fit the relevant security discourse (ibid, p.215). Dehumanising sentiments were intrinsically mirrored through the “othering” discourse, albeit “othering” was a prominent factor of European politics prior to 2015, the migrant crisis exacerbated its implications through “othering Islam as Europe’s external enemy” (Diez, 2010, p.319). The evolving rhetoric vilifying immigration was emboldened by White nationalism, whereby European politicians and civil society conflated Syrian migrants with a cultural threat to the durability of the EU, through their “nationalist imaginary”, reconstructing the “figure of the migrant” (Nail, 2016, p.158). Although various European outlets have “contested the depiction of migrants” as a liability, a general receptiveness to “uttering” migration as a security threat has been “crucial to the securitisation” of the Syrian migrant crisis (Fakhoury, 2016, p.73). The Orientalist discourse utilised by European politicians to securitise the migrant crisis is conveyed through exclusionary practices, notably various EU member-states’ “outright refusal” to accept Syrian Muslims on the grounds that as a Christian country it would be unable to “adequately accommodate them”, highlighting how “Europeanness functions as a defining logic of race”, predominantly based upon Whiteness, Christianity, and supposed modernity (Abbas, 2019, p.2457).
The Securitisation of Migrants: Institutional Backing:
Alongside rhetoric, this paper recognises the irrefutable role of institutional backing in securitising the migrant crisis, as well as the cruciality of recognising the interplay between discourse and practice; as there is a causal interplay, whereby rhetoric is enacted with institutional backing (Léonard, 2010, p.234).
Frontex: Focal Securitising Agency:
Perhaps the most notable institution accredited securitising the migrant crisis is Frontex (Léonard, 2009, p.371). Frontex is a key institution amongst EU member-states, echoing rhetorical sentiments, in defence of the nation-state’s integrity, launching initiatives to “physically protect the borders” with the building of walls, and the callous construction of barbed wires (Panebianco, 2020, p.1404). The security-migration nexus progressed, as Frontex became the focal point for “sharp criticisms”, as it was considered to have launched a “war against migrants” through tightening border controls, and deployment of practices commonly aimed at tackling “widely accepted security threats”, enhancing the association between migration and security (Kaunert, 2022, p.1426). Frontex’s coordination of joint operations at the EU’ external borders are consistently critiqued as the actors within these operations maintained “semi-military status” within the respective member-states (Carrera, 2010, p.6). Considering the actor’s semi-military status, the joint operations encouraged the linkage between migration and security threats, through the “semi-militarisation” of border controls, thereby securitising migration flows, “given the traditional role of military” in addressing “security issues” (Léonard, 2010, p.17). Sarah Léonard meticulously argues that Frontex securitises the Syrian migrant crisis, through the “extraordinary practices”, where she indicates such practices imply the problem tackled, is “exceptional and cannot be dealt with ordinary measures” (Léonard, 2016, p.516). Léonard’s suggestss that although Frontex’s operations are not new per say, the level of sophistication embedded within the operations to “expel certain groups of migrants” is “nowhere else in the world […] and never done before” (Léonard, 2010, p.29). The “extraordinary practices” alludes to Frontex’s lack of respect towards the non-refoulment principle, where Frontex essentially fails to prohibit member-states from “returning” individuals to their place of origin, irrespective of the prosecution they may face, violating their fundamental human rights (Papastavridis, 2010, p.102).
Conclusively, this paper explored the EU’s securitisation of the Syrian migrant crisis, delving into the foundations of the migration-security nexus highlighting rhetoric’s role in harbouring a collective sense of fear and hysteria, through framing Syrian migrants as threats to European identity and security. The paper then considered institutional backing, as a physical securitiser, drawing upon the mutually enforcing interplay of discourse and practice. This paper’s exploration regarding the extent to which the EU securitised the 2015 Syrian migrant crisis enriches the field of EU migratory studies, and political studies at large.
