Iberian Right-Wing Euroscepticism: A Low-Risk Scenario for the EU?

With the arrival of the Portuguese political party Chega and the Spanish Vox to their respective parliaments, the age of ‘Iberian exceptionalism’ came to an abrupt end. Theories that Iberian states were immune to 21st-century right-wing populism flourished before the late 2010s. Portugal and Spain’s transition to democracy from fascist dictatorships in 1975 and 1977 respectively, gave the impression that the remnants of brutal and repressive actions of a far-right force would remain in the minds of the general population, producing an ‘antidote’ for modern far-right populist forces.

Chega in Portugal now holds 12 seats in the National Assembly and Vox holds 52 seats in the National Congress, both having become the third political force in their countries (Info Electoral, 2019). Yet, although they have proved this ‘Iberian exceptionalism’ theory wrong, or at least outdated, there is an element of differentiation that remains when comparing these two parties with right-wing populists from across the European Union, and that is their attitudes towards EU institutions.

Iberian Right-Wing Euroscepticism: A Low-Risk Scenario for the EU?

Soft-Euroscepticism exists in other EU member state political parties, yet for it to be the singular anti-EU point of view on the right side of the political spectrum seems rare and intriguing. Parties across Europe have signalled their strong discontent with Brussels institutions over the past years. Both Germany’s AfD and Marine Le Pen’s RN in France have advocated for their countries to leave the Euro, and in Le Pen’s 2017 presidential candidacy, she proposed a referendum on remaining in the EU and to remove all EU flags from public buildings (Wildangel, 2020; Le Parisien, 2017). Although the flag proposal may seem symbolic and inconsequential if adopted, it demonstrates the strength of their anti-EU sentiment and can help clarify the attitudes among French far-right parties.

Chega and Vox present a vastly different project for the EU. Although both parties reiterate the importance of national sovereignty within the union, and Vox’s manifesto states the importance of reforms allowing national laws to take precedence over EU legislation at all times, both have firmly stated their opposition to withdrawing from European institutions or ending the EU (Vox, 2021; Chega, 2019; Expresso, 2021).

The underlying reasons that could explain possible discontent towards the European Union seem to be present in Portugal and Spain. The global recession of 2007-08 delivered significant harm to southern European countries’ economies. Both countries requested a bailout among EU institutions and, in turn, received strong demands in the form of austerity (Tremlett, 2012). This period of budgetary hardship saw large-scale protests in the streets of Lisbon and Madrid, a wave of discontent that saw the removal of governments from power and public services suffering under the cuts in funding.

Instead of noting a significant backlash against the EU, as was seen in Greece, Portugal and Spain remain significantly pro-European in their political approach. In the latest Eurobarometer report, Portugal and Spain consistently rank among the most optimistic and Europhile populations in the union. 68% of the Portuguese population trusts the EU, and 50% of the Spanish population says the same, both above the EU-27 average of 49 per cent (European Union, 2022). Portuguese and Spanish populations are also much less likely to say they have a negative image of the EU, with 4% and 13% respectively (European Union, 2022).

Even in what may potentially be the most significant question in a policy aspect, both countries are more likely to state that more decisions should be taken at an EU level, with 67% of the Portuguese population saying so, and an overwhelming 80% of the Spanish population supporting that position (European Union, 2022).

Strong trust and positivity among Iberian citizens towards the European Union is not inexplicable. Both Portugal and Spain gained EU membership only a decade after the rise of democracy in both states, rendering the concepts of democracy and the EU inextricably tied: if the EU falls, democracy fails. Both countries have also seen great long-term economic benefits derived from EU membership including a rise in productivity rates, disregarding the fact that both countries are also net receivers of the EU budget, thereby bringing investment to their territories (Royo, 2007; Buchholz, 2020).

Does ‘true’ Euroscepticism not exist in Iberia?

Although the political right in these two countries seems not to hold strong Eurosceptic views, it fails to mean that these Eurosceptic ideals are inexistent or inconsequential in Portuguese and Spanish politics. Since the Global Financial Crisis and the shockwaves felt in southern Europe, it has been the far-left that has dominated the anti-EU rhetoric in Iberia, making it a more central aspect of their campaigns than the far-right. Both Podemos in Spain and the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) in Portugal have shared their alternative projects for the future of the continent. In the Left Bloc’s 2019 electoral manifesto, they proposed eliminating the European common market and removing all financial decisions from the hands of EU institutions (Bloco de Esquerda, 2019).

With the far-left having taken up Euroscepticism as a core political issue of their campaigns for the last decade, and taking into account the relatively small proportion of the population holding negative feelings towards EU institutions, it can be argued that the far-right has seen no political benefits in focusing on these issues. Instead, Vox has sought to focus on the issue of immigration and the territorial integrity of Spain in the face of pro-independence forces, notably in Catalonia. In Portugal, Chega has similarly taken up the issue of immigration but has also focused strongly on the issues of crime and corruption.

Iberian Right-Wing Euroscepticism: A Low-Risk Scenario for the EU?

As discussed previously, the positions that Iberian far-right parties hold differ from some of the stances that other European far-right parties have expressed regarding the European Union. Referendums to leave the EU, and the dismantling of the Euro, all have been discussed in these European parties. Nonetheless, a softening of their position in the institution has begun to be noticed. The most prominent example of this might be Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National in France. In a debate with President Macron before the presidential elections of 2022, Le Pen stated that she was not for the withdrawal from the Euro, a U-turn from previously held beliefs. Le Pen has also mirrored calls for the EU to become a ‘commonwealth of nations’, as argued by Vox. France is far from being the sole member to have seen this change of heart. Newly elected Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, from the far-right party Brothers of Italy, has stated that her government will not “sabotage European integration” or leave the Union’s institutions (Roberts, 2022). This speech is a drastic new position compared to the calls to leave the Euro, and the mention that “the good times are over” directed to the EU (Roberts et al, 2022).

It seems that across the EU, previously strongly Eurosceptic far-right parties have been adapting their discourse in recent months. The reason for why is outside of the scope of this article, however, several arguments have been put forward ranging from the necessity for unity in the face of the war in Ukraine to the NextGenerationEU investment package that will inject millions into each member state economy in the coming years.

Far-right parties across Europe have moved closer to the Iberian soft-Eurosceptic model, eroding this idea of the new ‘Iberian Exceptionalism’, yet, although these parties may seem to have become less of a threat to the EU, they remain one.

Vox and Chega remain far-right Eurosceptic parties who, when given the chance, would push to adopt reforms to the EU and its treaties to dilute EU power. They might not advocate for the end of these institutions, but a hollow EU serves little purpose. Moreover, the risks that political parties of the same ideological families have brought to the EU have been seen through the actions of the Polish and Hungarian governments, both led by far-right populist parties, and the actions of Meloni’s governments are yet to be perceived.

Conclusion

Differentiation between Iberian and European parties on the far-right remains possible. Both Chega and Vox focus much less on the EU in their campaigns and political actions than others. Yet, the line between soft and hard Euroscepticism is thin. Both aim to reduce the power of the institutions in Brussels and ‘restore’ national sovereignty in the globalised world that they are so opposed to. The Portuguese and Spanish populations remain strongly pro-EU and this position is likely to continue in the coming decades. However, to understate both the potential and the willingness of these two parties to shape EU institutions in the way they see fit would be a serious mistake that could cost the unity of European countries going forward.