Is the ‘Cyprus Problem’ also Britain’s Problem?
Alexandra Van Zutphen is studying for a Master’s in History at UCL. She participated in the Cyprus Friendship Program for two years, where student activists engaged in peace-building activities and projects in the effort of improving Greek-Turkish Cypriot relations.
This year marked the fifty year anniversary of Turkey’s invasion into North Cyprus on the 20th of July, 1974. This cataclysmic event was marked very differently by the two sides of the still-divided nation: as air raid sirens sounded in the South to mark the harrowing sound of invasion, the Turkish-Cypriot government commemorated the day by celebrating the establishment of their breakaway state, which is still not internationally recognised. [1] Yet, as news sources worldwide emphasise the everlasting stalemate embodied by the ‘Cyprus talks’ for reconciliation — Turkish Cyprus favours a two-state arrangement while Greek Cyprus wants a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (BBF) [2] — the legacy of Britain’s involvement in the creation of the crisis remains consistently unacknowledged. Since, as the Commonwealth heads have agreed, the time has come for a ‘reparations dialogue’ and a greater evaluation of Britain’s colonial legacy worldwide, Britain’s key role in designing the destruction of Cyprus’ ambitions as an independent state also deserves further examination.
Upon the Ottoman Empire’s entry into WWI in support of the Central Powers, Britain declared Egypt, Sudan and Cyprus protectorates of the British empire. [3] Cyprus was officially incorporated as a crown colony in 1923, to be known as ‘British Cyprus’ until the country’s independence from the British in 1960. It is worth mentioning that Greek and Turkish Cypriots had coexisted in an overwhelmingly peaceful manner for nearly four centuries up until this point. While many things may have contributed to the rise of ethnic polarisation between the two sides, including Kemal Atatürk’s increasingly nationalist approach to Turkey’s international identity and the Greek Cypriot movement for unity with Greece, it is important to consider the central role of Britain’s ‘divide and rule’ policy, which pitted the two ethnic groups against each other in a bid to strengthen their hold over the island. While a much larger case of ‘divide et impera’ played out in the British Raj, where a ‘systematic policy of fomenting separate consciousness’ among the two communities was launched following the Revolt of 1857 [4], similar, small-scale examples can be found in Britain’s approach to rule in Cyprus. In dealing with the internal threat of EOKA, a guerrilla force organising a campaign against British rule, Britain sanctioned the creation of the British auxiliary police force called the ‘Special Mobile Reserve’ to combat the movement, [5] thus setting an exclusively Turkish Cypriot force against a group of Greek Cypriot soldiers. The creation of this police branch was incredibly contentious, even within the British administration at the time, and its contribution to ethnic, inter-communal tensions would prove to be immensely damaging in the build-up to 1974.
Unpacking the events leading up to the invasion is not straightforward; the many, multilayered aspects of political turmoil that led to the eventual culmination of violence just prior to the 1974 invasion are often over-simplified when dealt with by international news sources. The reality was that Cyprus faced the issue of growing nationalism on both sides, worsened by external intervention. EOKA, the ‘National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, led by Greek general Georgios Grivas, sought for Cypriot unification with the Kingdom of Greece, taking its cue from Crete’s incorporation into Greece following independence from the Ottomans in 1913. This ‘Enosis’ movement provoked The Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) into declaring war on the Cypriot rebels, their intention being to prevent an exodus of the island’s Turkish minority similar to that faced by the Cretan Turks after Crete’s incorporation. Organised directly by the Turkish government, and coupled with the post-independence movement for Taksim (split partition between Greece and Turkey), the TMT represented the Turkish Cypriot minority’s newfound alienation from Cyprus’ developing post-colonial identity.
Independence from the British, finally achieved in August of 1960, brought about more trouble than triumph [6]. In formulating the Constitution of Cyprus, Britain deemed it appropriate to assign 30% of governmental posts to Turkish Cypriots, despite them comprising only 18.3% of the population. The new political setup also ensured the country’s Vice President would be Turkish Cypriot, thereby giving the Turkish Cypriot minority a potentially disproportionate say in Cypriot affairs, seeing as the Vice President reserved the right to veto in pivotal decision-making scenarios [7]. This arrangement led to a series of governmental disagreements as the Turkish minority was consistently able to overrule constitutional changes proposed by President Makarios, and underlying tensions eventually found their outlet in a series of violent riots in 1962. By the end of 1963, Cypriot blood had been shed on both sides, thousands of Turkish Cypriots had been displaced, and Turkey had intervened on the island, capturing a strategically-important road that would be a crucial transport link during the subsequent invasion [8]. Perhaps what is most central to the future disaster of the invasion, however, was a treaty promulgated in August 1960, labelled the ‘Treaty of Guarantee’ between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In addition to granting Britain sovereignty over the military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia (thus ensuring that Britain could retain its Middle Eastern presence following Egypt and Jordan’s independence), Article IV of the treaty gave Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom the ‘right to take action’ and intervene in the case of a political emergency [9]. This article was eventually cited by Turkey as justification for its invasion of Cyprus, though the de jure ruling today recognises the Republic of Cyprus’ full sovereignty over the island, thus limiting Turkey’s claim over Northern Cyprus to that of an illegal occupation
When it comes to an ongoing, seemingly irreparable geopolitical crisis such as the situation in Cyprus, there can be no direct and absolute assignment of blame. There is, however, a historical reality about Britain’s involvement in Cyprus which appears universally apparent: as the once-great empire faced the reality of its decline, it was unwilling to part with such a valuable geographical asset on the Middle Eastern periphery. This led to the creation – though perhaps partially unintentional – of a geopolitical situation that guaranteed Britain access to the all-important Mediterranean island. The fact that Britain still holds sovereignty over the Akrotiri and Dhekelia bases to this day is a fact that has not received the international scrutiny that such a situation calls for. Perhaps it is time to recognise the Republic of Cyprus’ claim that the British bases in Cyprus are a ‘remnant of colonialism’ [10], ill-fitting within the framework of a post-imperial world. Allowing Britain to retain 2.5% of the island as a foothold for executing its various covert military campaigns — from U-2 flights over Syria during the cold war [11] to alleged military aid of Israel in its war in Gaza [12] — is not conducive to promoting the island’s future as a single, unified and non-affiliated state. One hundred years on, the ghost of Britain’s colonial might is still grasping onto Cyprus with its spindly fingers — only once that hold is loosened will the lacerated island begin to heal its deep-running wounds.
[1] Kambas, M. (2024) ‘Cyprus conflict: Key issues on 50th anniversary of Turkish invasion’, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-key-issues-cyprus-conflict-50-years-since-invasion-2024-07-18/
[2] Michaelides, A. (2024) ‘Well, what have we got to lose’, en.philenews, available at: https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/opinion/well-what-have-we-got-to-lose/
[3] ‘The Treaty of Lausanne’, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (1924) American Journal of International Law. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[4] Tharoor, S. ‘The Partition: The British game of ‘divide and rule’, Aljazeera. Available at:https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/8/10/the-partition-the-british-game-of-divide-and-rule
[5] Corum, J. (2008) Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency, Berlin: Zenith Imprint, pp.109-110
[6] O'Malley, B., Craig, I. (1999) The Cyprus Conspiracy. London: IB Tuaris, p. 77.
[7] Andrew, B. (2000) Cyprus: A Troubled Island. Westport: Praeger, p.47.
[8] Henn, F. (2004) A Business of Some Heat: The United Nations Force in Cyprus Before and During the 1974 Turkish Invasion, Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books
[9] ‘Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus’ (1960) Article IV, United Nations Treaty Collection. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801388a2
[10] ‘Joint report on Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Legal Affairs Committees on the subject entitled "British Bases (Political and Legal Aspects)"’, Cyprus House of Representatives (2004). Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20210306053107/http://www2.parliament.cy/parliamentgr/008_05b/008_05_1543.htm
[11] Aldrich, R. (2011). GCHQ, London: Harper Press. pp. 320–323, 329–332
