Jordan - A faltering bridge over troubled waters?

Tan Kian Ann is a second year BSc Politics and International Relations student, with an interest in uncovering the nuance behind on-going policies and individual agendas.

Earlier this year on 13 Feb, Jordan’s King Abdullah II denounced Hamas’ Oct 7 attack as “unacceptable to Muslims” during a meeting with US President Biden in the White House [1]. Yet in the very same month, it was reported that the events of Oct 7 were added to the Jordanian National Civic Education book for the 10th grade [2], where the attack was justified as a form of retaliation against the “Israeli enemy”. These contradictory official narratives reveal a risky balancing act played by the Jordanian government in its attempt to navigate the Israel-Hamas conflict by appealing to both domestic audiences and international allies. 

Context? Jordan, on the one hand, is critically dependent on Israel and the West. More than $20 billion in economic assistance has been provided by the US government to Jordan since 1946 [3], whereas Israel has been supplying fresh water to Jordan since the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace treaty [4]. On the other hand, Jordan hosts the largest proportion of the Palestinian diaspora in the world today as a result of displacement from the 1948 and 1967 war - where 20% of its population is Palestinian [5]. The Jordanian government must therefore seek a balance between its foreign policy of maintaining ties with its allies and addressing public outrage regarding the plight of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

Jordan’s increasing domestic instability

Yet chants of “Repeat and Repeat October 7”, “All Jordanians support Hamas” in protests near the Israeli embassy in Amman earlier this year point at an unquellable public sentiment [6]; the tripled representation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the House of Representatives as a result of the 2024 election reveal Jordanians’ continued dissatisfaction toward the government's current approach to the conflict [7]. When Jordan’s air force intercepted and shot down Iranian drones crossing over Jordanian airspace toward Israel, fabricated headlines that Princess Salma of Jordan played a role were heavily circulated [8]; images on social media depicted King Abdullah as a traitor wearing the Israeli flag [9]. While the Jordanian government often attempts to communicate its nuanced position of upholding Jordanian sovereignty and not taking sides to remain as a credible mediator [10], the events above support the argument that it has gained little ground in the narrative domain.

Jordan’s increasing domestic instability, unfortunately, stretches beyond the narrative domain. The killing of three Israeli workers by a truck driver at the border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank point at Jordan’s increasing struggle with radicalisation and terrorism [11]. The foiling of a suspected Iranian-led plot to smuggle weapons into Jordan to help Hamas-linked cells of the Muslim Brotherhood carry out acts of sabotage indicate the looming threat of external interference [12]. 

External influences 

As Jordan continues to be caught in the middle of the Iran-Israel proxy war and the Israel-Hamas conflict, it can only expect to face an upward trajectory of external destabilising forces. Why? On the one hand, a destabilised Jordan facilitates Iran’s multi-front strategy against Israel - where opportunities to use Jordanian airspace to attack Israel are opened, and where arms routes passing through Jordan to support Hamas in the West Bank are less interfered with [13]. On the other hand, an unstable Jordan offers Hamas a strategic location to set up its base of operations against Israel - of which has previously been suggested by a Hamas political chief [14], Mousa Abu Marzouk. Therefore, one can expect Iran and Hamas to continue to attempt to sway the Jordanian narrative in favour of discrediting or even unseating the Hashemites, and supporting the development of Hamas or Iran-linked cells within Jordanian territory.

But perhaps the straw that has the power to break the camel’s back ultimately rests in the hands of Israel. Assaults by the Israeli military on settlements and refugee camps in the West Bank [15], paralleled by violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers on Palestinian villages [16], raise the possibility of a mass displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan. In fact, the “Jordan is Palestine” paradigm has long been advocated by right-wing Zionists as an alternative option to the two-state solution - where Jordan is recognised as the true Palestinian state and subsumes Palestine in a confederation [17].

Jordan’s Red Line: Demographic Stability

From the Jordanian perspective, the sharp demographic change resulting from displacement or unification would constitute an existential threat to the Hashemite Kingdom and increase the risk of social upheaval. On the one hand, ethnic tensions are bound to rise between Palestinians and East Jordanians - the latter’s position in Jordanian society challenged by the former. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the newly-displaced Palestinians recognise the Hashemites as their legitimate ruler. These hypotheses are particularly supported by the historical experience of Black September [18]- where Palestinian refugee camps established in Jordan as a result of the 1967 Six-Day war provided opportunities for the development of Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) ‘fedayeens’, which ultimately culminated in violent clashes between the Hashemites and the PLO. In light of the above considerations, Jordan has made attempts to convey a strict stance by refusing to admit a single Palestinian refugee during the Israel-Hamas conflict, and warning that any attempt by Israel to displace Palestinians on Jordanian territory would be considered to cross a “red line” and constitute a “declaration of war” [19][20].

If Israel is to be assumed to act rationally, it must favour Jordanian stability and hence avoid the aforementioned mass displacement. The 307km Israel-Jordan border, while acting as a critical protective buffer from Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ today, would be converted into a porous ‘point of vulnerability’ tomorrow if Jordan were to become weak and devolve into another of Iran’s proxies.

Currently, Jordan adopts a tough approach in preserving its internal stability - it works with Israeli intelligence to detect and pin down underground militias, and cracks down on pro-Palestinian journalists and activists [21][22]. Yet as Jordan experiences a worsening economic downturn and as Palestinian sympathy continues to heighten, continued repression is no long term strategy as it further increases the fractures between the Jordanian government and its people. Perhaps improved strategic communications is the way out for Jordan - for instance, the symbiotic relationship shared between Jordan and Israel may be framed as not only immutable, but one that possesses value for the opportunities it creates for the former to apply pressure on the latter and thus obtain better bargains for Palestinians during the war and beyond. Jordan’s unique position of neutrality may also be highlighted as a key to mitigate the spread of conflict in the region, and as one that presents opportunities to construct pathways toward peace. And indeed, one can only hope that we would eventually witness the light of peace.

Works Cited

[1] Magid, J. (2024) Jordan king says Oct. 7 attack unacceptable to Muslims, calls for ‘lasting’ ceasefire. https://www.timesofisrael.com/jordan-king-calls-for-lasting-ceasefire-says-oct-7-attack-unacceptable-to-muslims/.

[2] Jordan News (2024) Jordan’s school curriculum includes Oct. 7 events, sparks national pride. https://www.jordannews.jo/Section-109/News/Jordan-s-school-curriculum-includes-Oct-7-events-sparks-national-pride-33917.

[3] U.S. Agency for International Development (2024). https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/our-work#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Government%20has%20provided,in%20economic%20assistance%20since%201946.

[4] Foundation for Defense of Democracies (2024b) Israel Renews Water-Sharing Agreement With Jordan Despite Strained Bilateral Ties. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/05/19/israel-renews-water-sharing-agreement-with-jordan-despite-strained-bilateral-ties/.

[5] Saman, M. (2023) 'In Jordan, a sprawling Palestinian diaspora looks towards Gaza,' The New York Times, 22 December. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/20/magazine/jordan-palestinian-refugees.html.

[6] Hindustan Times (2024) 'Hail Hamas' movement in Jordan; 'Repeat October 7' chants near Israeli embassy in Amman. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uh0M7K3ZlKI.

[7] Al Jazeera (2024a) 'Jordan’s Islamist opposition party tops parliamentary elections,' Al Jazeera, 11 September. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/11/jordans-islamist-opposition-party-tops-parliamentary-elections.

[8] France 24 (2024) No proof that Princess Salma of Jordan shot down Iranian drones. https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/truth-or-fake/20240417-no-proof-that-princess-salma-of-jordan-shot-down-iranian-drones.

[9] Wintour, P. (2024) 'Jordan faces difficult balancing act amid row over role in downing Iranian drones,' The Guardian, 16 April. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/15/jordan-difficult-balancing-act-row-downing-iranian-drones-israel.

[10] Salhani, J. (2024) 'Tightrope: Jordan’s balancing act between Iran and Israel,' Al Jazeera, 22 April. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/21/tightrope-jordans-balancing-act-between-iran-and-israel.

[11] Fisher, M. (2024) Three killed in attack at West Bank-Jordan border, Israel says. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0qexxqdxvdo.

[12] Nakhoul, S. and Al-Khalidi, S. (2024) Jordan foils arms plot as kingdom caught in Iran-Israel shadow war. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/.

[13] Spyer, J. (2024) Tracking Iran’s Weapons Route into the West Bank. https://www.meforum.org/tracking-iran-weapons-route-into-the-west-bank.

[14] Horovitz, M. (2024) Jordan flatly rejects senior Hamas official’s idea of moving leadership to kingdom. https://www.timesofisrael.com/jordan-flatly-rejects-senior-hamas-officials-idea-of-moving-leadership-to-kingdom/.

[15] Staff, A.J. (2024) 'Israel’s war on the West Bank,' Al Jazeera, 28 August. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/28/israels-war-on-the-west-bank.

[16] Al Jazeera (2024b) 'US issues more sanctions over Israeli ‘settler violence’ in West Bank,' Al Jazeera, 28 August. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/28/us-issues-more-sanctions-over-israeli-settler-violence-in-west-bank.

[17] Washington, A.C., DC (2021) The “Jordan is Palestine” idea resurfaces again. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-jordan-is-palestine-idea-resurfaces-again/.

[18] France 24 (2020) Fifty years ago: Black September for PLO. https://www.france24.com/en/20200915-fifty-years-ago-black-september-for-plo.

[19] Muasher, M. (2023) Jordan’s redline on admitting Palestinians is unlikely to change. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/11/jordans-redline-on-admitting-palestinians-is-unlikely-to-change?lang=en.

[20] The Palestine Chronicle (2024) ‘Declaration of War’ - Jordan Warns against Displacement of Palestinians. https://www.palestinechronicle.com/declaration-of-war-jordan-warns-against-displacement-of-palestinians/.

[21] Foundation for Defense of Democracies (2024a) Iran handed Jordan and Israel an opportunity to improve ties. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/05/01/iran-handed-jordan-and-israel-an-opportunity-to-improve-ties/.

[22] Amnesty International (2024) Jordan: Stop cracking down on pro-Gaza protests and release those charged for exercising their freedoms of assembly and expression. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/jordan-stop-cracking-down-on-pro-gaza-protests-and-release-those-charged-for-exercising-their-freedoms-of-assembly-and-expression/.

(Link for picture: https://www.voanews.com/a/analysis-mass-protests-rock-jordan-key-us-ally-in-mideast/7317716.html)