K-Culture Diplomacy: Healthy Competition for Japan?
Tiffany Fu is a first-year BA History student. Her primary research interests lie in East Asian relations as well as international soft power dynamics. (www.linkedin.com/in/tiffany-fu-262b60236)
Introduction
Millions of fans worldwide were shocked when the UK's King Charles III 'name-checked' the star-studded members of K-pop phenomenon Blackpink at the British-South Korean state banquet in November 2023. This move was a testament to the overarching influence of South Korean pop culture on the wider world with, as Charles III himself put it, its 'remarkable ability to captivate imaginations' (Coughlan, 2023). South Korea must have been over the moon, for the nation's 'K-Culture diplomacy' had seemingly worked with significant success. But for contenders of that same level of influence – in particular, Japan – is this a sign of healthy competition, or perhaps a much graver omen?
From K-Culture to 'K-Culture Diplomacy'
South Korea still considers itself a 'middle power' within the international world, but culturally, it is truly a global powerhouse (The Guardian, 2022). Despite its relatively small overall output, South Korea's pop culture industry has gained global influence incomparable to its other sectors (Choe, 2021). K-pop's near-flawless boy and girl groups, catchy songs, and big-budget music videos have monopolised global music charts and generated billions since the mid-2010s. Success for the nation's film and 'K-Drama' industry came relatively later, arguably when the South Korean film 'Parasite' became the first non-English international film to win Best Picture at the 92nd Oscars in 2020 (Choe, 2021).
The global rise of Korean pop culture is a complex phenomenon. It would not have been possible without the nation's brilliant artistic minds and the rise of video-streaming platforms such as YouTube and Netflix, which propelled Korean entertainment to the globe (Choe, 2021). However, we seem to have neglected a key stakeholder: the South Korean government. Most assume that the South Korean government contributed little to K-Culture's global ascent, with one of its previous administrations even blacklisting thousands of artists and entertainers back in 2016 (The Guardian, 2022). However, the government has supported the film and TV industry financially since the 1990s by encouraging corporate investment and vertical integration (Gibson, 2020). Later efforts under Kim Dae-jung's administration increased subsidies to the film and music industries and the budget of the cultural sector by over USD 500 million (Goto, 2022). In recent years, it has acknowledged the global impact of its popular culture. In 2020, the government postponed conscription for BTS member Kim Seok-jin so that the group could continue its activities. Under governmental approval, Netflix installed a giant 'Squid Game' statue in Seoul (Choe, 2021).
Seoul has displayed a desire to channel this massive cultural influence into existing diplomatic endeavours to boost its soft power. South Korea has brought its celebrities to traditional diplomatic events – perhaps why the K-pop group Blackpink was brought to the British-South Korean state banquet in November 2023 (Gibson, 2020). K-pop idols now facilitate cross-national exchange: former President Moon Jae-in brought some of the nation's K-pop superstars to summits and meetings with world leaders such as now-President-elect Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron (Gibson, 2020). They also have proven helpful in assisting South Korea navigate key negotiations with the North: K-pop stars Red Velvet and Baek-Ji Young performed in Pyongyang, celebrating the first summit between Moon's administration and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in 2018 (Gibson, 2020). Idols are now ambassadors, even diplomats: former President Moon Jae-in's administration appointed BTS as 'Special Presidential Envoy' at the 76th United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, likely the fruit of South Korea's continued efforts at executing its 2017 Public Diplomacy Act, which placed K-pop at the heart of cultural diplomacy (Le, 2021). Representing South Korea, idols and celebrities have advocated for youth activism and various humanitarian and environmental causes, enabling South Korea to brand itself as a progressive, empathetic global actor.
Analysts have, however, argued that this contributed more to South Korea's‘ nation branding' rather than the advancement of true soft power. Setting up South Korean celebrities as its ambassadors has undoubtedly enhanced South Korea's multicultural and humanitarian image, yet on many occasions, it has merely garnered performative fan support for its events rather than awareness or support towards foreign policies – such as trade promotion and development, health security and territorial disputes – as most of its celebrities have not spoken on such topics, limiting the practice of Joseph Nye's definition of 'soft power', which attracts outcomes rather than coerces it (Gibson, 2020; Nye, 2021).
There are, however, instances where K-Culture naturally contributed to South Korea's existing diplomacy without governmental involvement. Researchers have demonstrated how media such as K-dramas can act as a form of cultural diplomacy, as they often show elements of Korean culture, such as instruments, architecture, food or clothing (Gibson, 2020; Mirshahi, 2021). This creates a 'spillover effect': initially attracting foreign audiences on a superficial level before exposing them to other aspects of Korean culture (Mirshahi, 2021). For example, after BTS member Jungkook was seenshopping for a modernised Korean traditional hanbok, the garment designer became inundated with overseas orders. Foreign audiences can then approach K-Culture on a deeper level, enabling further cultural exchange (Mirshahi, 2021). This effect complements traditional diplomatic techniques practised by South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which involves displaying Korean artwork and cultural assets at diplomatic missions and organising annual Korea Culture Festivals (MOFA). The MOFA has also endeavoured to combine K-Culture with its knowledge-oriented cultural diplomacy, such as endorsing Korean language classes using BTS-themed textbooks (Gibson, 2020).
More than just (healthy) competition for Japan?
South Korea’s cultural prowess is often contrasted against that of its neighbour and perhaps rival, Japan. Musically, Japan’s pop music and idol industry, ‘J-pop’, has been unable to catch up to the advent of ‘K-pop’, with lower viewership and smaller regional fandoms compared to South Korea's global reach. This has forced the J-pop industry to ‘refashion itself’ based on the globally successful K-pop model (Jin, 2020). The global streaming platforms that have propelled K-dramas on an international scale have catered significantly less to Japanese dramas, with more than 60% of Netflix users having watched at least one Korean title as of 2023, but much less so for Japanese dramas (Tran, 2023).
However, Japan has yet to directly counteract these influences, perhaps because it already has an established global cultural market outside its TV and idol industries. Japanese anime and manga, which have been culturally significant and internationally popular since the 1980s, have enjoyed substantial success and continue to do so, with Japan’s animation industry generating $22bn in 2023 (AJA, 2024). The nation also has an established history of conducting ‘pop culture diplomacy’, capitalising on its own popular culture to enhance Japan’s image and shift away from its colonial history as a key soft power strategy. Its initial efforts in the late 1980s focused on exporting its TV programmes to the wider world, even subsidising developing countries to import them. Greater focus was then placed on appealing to Asian youth who had not experienced Japanese imperialism (through popular music, animation and comic books), particularly among Thai, Singaporean and Hong Kong youth (Iwabuchi, 2015). In the 2000s, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed campaigns to further promote its cultural diplomacy, establishing the annual Japan International MANGA Award in May 2007, appointing prominent anime characters such as Doraemon as Anime Ambassadors, and providing funding for showcases of Japanese pop cultures (Singh, 2023). These initiatives were implemented with demonstrated success, with more people studying the Japanese language and culture worldwide and Japan’s animation industry remaining internationally favoured, such that Japan could boast the image of a culturally innovative and rich nation (Singh, 2023).
Moreover, the Japanese government may not necessarily see K-Culture as a threat but rather as an opportunity to restore its damaged relations with South Korea. Japanese pop culture and K-Culture have always been of mutual mass appeal: Japan is now the leading consumer of the K-pop industry, whereas Japanese anime films have continuously topped Korean box offices. Crucial developments in K-Culture in the past decade have further propelled this mutual interaction, with particularly huge influences on the youth. As it seems, younger generations in Japan and South Korea have become increasingly distant from collective wartime memory and thus more receptive towards each other’s cultures. Recent studies have shown that youth mutual perceptions have improved compared to older generations (Ashley and Su, 2024). The Japanese government has long seen its diplomatic efforts on pop culture as an effective way of curbing anti-Japanese sentiments in South Korea, as it is believed that South Korean youth who consume Japanese media culture would be more tolerant towards Japan's colonial history, thus bearing fruit for Japanese public diplomacy (Iwabuchi, 2015).
Sadly, the ‘cultural’ continues to be separated from the ‘political’: ‘pop culture diplomacy’ seems to have little effect on how the Japanese and South Koreans think of each other politically. A survey conducted in 2019 reflected that 87.9% of Japanese people still viewed Japan-South Korea relations as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’; scholars have also argued that Japanese audiences attracted to K-Culture, especially the youth, are mostly uninterested in international relations and politics, and thus are indifferent when it comes to Japan-South Korea relations (Goto, 2022). Political antagonism continues to be aggravated by ongoing disputes, such as the territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo, and historical grievances over the issues of early 20th-century Japanese imperialism in Korea, all of which remain unresolved. The Japanese government, for example, has tried to financially compensate victims of its 'comfort women' system (which subjected Korean women to sexual slavery). However, these efforts have been seen as an effective 'selling out' of victims by the South Korean public (Ashley and Su, 2024). Entertainment shows and music involving these historical debates further exacerbate the issue: Gyeongseong Creature, a South Korean period drama miniseries based in the historical context of South Korea under Japanese colonialism, was mostly attacked by Japanese audiences as intentionally spreading ‘anti-Japanese propaganda within Korea’ (Lee, 2024). Cultural appeal is, thus, according to experts, unable to ‘transcend historical issues’ and transform Japan-South Korea relations in the long term (Iwabuchi, 2015; Goto, 2022).
New Prospects for Pop Culture Diplomacy?
The international craze for K-pop seems to have waned since its peak in the late 2010s. Industry veterans have argued that the COVID-19 pandemic, the hiatus of internationally popular boy group BTS in 2022, as well as recent disputes within prominent K-pop companies, contributed to the plummet in physical album sales (of more than 20 million) for the first time in nine years, as well as the drastic fall in stock performance for major K-pop agencies (FP, 2025). However, there is no doubt that the genre will continue to be a staple of the international music scene. There have been key examples where cultural exports from non-Western societies remained internationally prevalent after their breakthrough, such as Japan’s continued dominance in its animation industry four decades on. With its established K-pop industry and international broadcasts of its well-loved K-dramas, K-Culture may be able to follow suit. By extension, K-Culture diplomacy will remain prominent and, if utilised appropriately, an integral part of South Korea’s overall diplomatic strategy.
However, current efforts at turning pop culture into pop culture diplomacy, for not only South Korea and Japan but perhaps the entirety of East Asia, remain significantly less effective than its economic counterparts, a huge reason being the inability of pop culture to shape political views, as well as the reluctance of political leaders to address deep-rooted historical and contemporary disputes. Perhaps it is necessary to show genuine commitment to resolving existing political conflicts before advancing international cultural exchange and one's soft power with popular culture (Iwabuchi, 2015). Until then, pop culture in East Asia will continue to thrive and capture the imaginations of not only its audiences, but also perhaps promising cultural diplomats who want to make the world a better place.
Works Cited
