Labour’s rethink of Sino-British relations

Phoebe Lang-Clapp is a second year International Social and Political Studies student. She is primarily interested in international conflict and security studies.  

A new era for British politics  

Starmer’s Britain has passed its four-month anniversary. Almost 20 years of Conservative governance have been put to bed. Our collective memory of a few tumultuous years in British politics may feel somewhat fresh, but equally, perhaps the former DPP’s vision of self-marketed ‘serious’ politics marks a new chapter of grown-up governance we might have forgotten even existed.  

What is ‘Starmerism’? A concrete definition seems rather elusive. Then, how to define this new era of British politics? At the time of writing, the administration has seen little over 100 days in office. From somebody whose first two manifesto chapters read ‘Change’ and ‘My Plan for Change’, one would imagine this government would like to create, at least, an illusion of policy divergence. Yet, it is hard to pin down any perennial stance from what appears to be an endlessly flexible frontman. The headline-grabbing ‘ban’ on smoking in pub gardens was quietly ditched not long after its proposition. One might say that progress is self-evident; work has been done on rail nationalisation, and the Rwanda bill was scrapped [1], but high-profile tax rises on National Insurance contributions paid by employers and increases in Capital Gains Tax [2] while not technically amounting to increases for ‘working people’ as per the party’s ambiguous definition, have not helped defeat allegations that Labour appears positionally unsure.  

Lammy’s vision for a reformed relationship  

Today, the issues most pertinent for British voters remain the economy, health, and immigration. [3] Given the significant distraction of the inheritance of a struggling economy, with a public sector net debt provisionally estimated at 100% of GDP in August [4], one could just about be forgiven for missing Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s trip to Beijing to meet his counterpart Wang Yi in October. An amelioration of London-Beijing relations has possibly not been the poster child of the Labour campaign, yet attentive readers of the 2024 pre-election publication would have noted that, 

‘After 14 years of damaging Conservative inconsistency over China, Labour will bring a long-term and strategic approach to managing our relations…We will improve the UK’s capability to understand and respond to the challenges and opportunities China poses through an audit of our bilateral relationship.’ [5] 

Whitehall’s audit so far appears relatively low-profile and follows a wider rhetoric of a relations rehaul. Lammy’s Foreign Affairs essay in which he outlined his ‘progressive realism’ vision for Britain’s place in what he characterised as a dramatically changed world order argued for ‘a consistent strategy’, a far cry from the ‘overt hostility’ and ‘confused ambiguity’ of previous Tory foreign policy [6]. The foreign minister recognises the ‘systemic challenge’ posed by Beijing concerning British security, but simultaneously acknowledges the weight of our economic interdependence.  

So, in practice, how has this diplomatic reformation played out? The Foreign Office’s statement declares that the meeting of both ministers was ‘constructive across the full breadth of the bilateral relationship.’ [7] Progress was said to have been made on the so-called global green transition, and the ever-important sector of AI; equally, Lammy raised ‘serious concerns’ over Hong Kong. [7] While seemingly productive, it is perhaps too early to see a real departure in foreign policy tone. Such statements do not feel inherently novel. A commitment to the cautious approach seems one, if perhaps the only, constant of Starmer’s administration.  

British-Chinese relations in the recent past  

It is worth reflecting on the diplomatic trajectory Britain has witnessed in the recent past. Take the last 10 years of Conservative government. Its administration saw sizeable fluctuation in Sino-British relations, with significant tensions over Hong Kong, controversial cybersecurity policy, and human rights abuses in Xinjiang [8]. Indeed, the Hong Kong issue appears a central sticking point: a relatively stable Sino-British relationship took an arguably decisive turn with the crackdown in the city by Beijing in 2019. Taken holistically, British attitudes towards its bilateral relationship have been framed largely from a defensive security perspective; semantically, China appears to have been characterised as a threat more so than a potential partner. Slightly reticent acknowledgement of British dependence on China’s economy seems the long-running basis of, and motivation for, the states’ productive relationship. 

If Cameron facilitated the emergence of a ‘golden era’ of economic and political engagement between the states spanning roughly 10 years [9], Johnson declared himself ‘fervently Sinophile’ [10] and Sunak claimed the state was a ‘threat to the UK’s way of life’ [11] what room is there to pave a new path? If Lammy markets his vision on ‘consistency’, it’s unclear as to what he wants to be consistent with, yet. On one hand, amid inter-party wars over its readiness, the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme – which appears an attempt on the British part to defend itself from China and other ‘malign forces’ [12] has been delayed in anticipation of the Whitehall audit. The tone of Lammy’s visit to Beijing was not a huge departure from his predecessors’ attitudes. On the other hand, Starmer has pledged to increase UK military presence in the South China Sea. [13]. Given the uncertainty of Labour’s position thus far, however, it is hard to be sure this is definite. British activity in the South China Sea has historically produced mixed success: in short, Starmer has inherited a real task. 

Attempts to address the issue have largely gravitated around a kind of regional balancing, explicitly laid out in the Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’ proposed in 2021, which was proposed following a sentiment that the UK had thus far failed to engage effectively in this region, especially given its geopolitical significance. [14] Yet, in the essence that a ‘tilt’ implies an indeterminate process, consensus appears to suggest that work in this area is unfinished. The Defence Committee report of 2022-3 outlines,  

‘The result has been a modest increase in UK military presence in the region… 

The Government states that the tilt is now complete, and it will be made a permanent pillar of the UK’s foreign policy. We reject the notion that the ‘tilt’ has been “achieved” from a Defence perspective.’ [15] 

If Starmer is committed to fundamentally changing the relationship, he will need to take more convincing steps than his predecessors.  

Looking to the future  

It really may be too early to say conclusively, audit pending, what kind of tone British-Chinese relations will take. The recent re-election of Trump will doubtlessly throw another spanner in the works, now that Starmer must negotiate Britain’s bilateral relations with both the US and China at once, at a time when the relationship between the two itself will likely become more strained. Former US national security adviser Nadia Schadlow is reported to have claimed that the UK’s divergent attitude to China could jeopardise the Special Relationship, creating in her words what would be a ‘negative ripple effect.’ [16]. Perhaps the contingency of the UK on the US policy-wise will never be felt as strongly as in a world where Britain must strike out on its own post-Brexit. Starmer will be forced to navigate a world in which these two vying powers come head-to-head in renewed tension. Britain cannot sustainably court both states if the U.S. takes on a path of sanction-throwing hostility.  At the end of the day, maybe Britain will be forced to come to the uncomfortable realisation that whatever attitude it pursues toward China, it will likely not make a great deal of difference to international affairs. It would now be delusional to suggest that Britain and China were on equal footing geopolitically, to lump us both in as ‘global players’ as proclaimed in Lammy’s aspirational statement. [6] 

Works Cited  

[1] Stacey, K. (2024). The Starmer story so far: what has Labour done in its first 100 days? [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/oct/12/the-starmer-story-so-far-what-has-labour-done-in-its-first-100-days [Accessed 10 Nov. 2024]. 

[2] Beck, M. (2024). Autumn budget 2024: Key announcements and analysis. [online] House of Lords Library. Available at: https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/autumn-budget-2024-key-announcements-and-analysis/. 

[3] Yougov (2024). Most important issues facing Britain 2019 | Statista. [online] Statista. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/886366/issues-facing-britain/. 

[4] Ons.gov.uk. (2024). Public Sector Finances, UK. [online] Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/bulletins/publicsectorfinances/august2024. 

[5] The Labour Party (2024). Britain reconnected – The Labour Party. [online] The Labour Party. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/change/britain-reconnected/. 

[6] Lammy, D. (2024). The Case for Progressive Realism. [online] Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-kingdom/case-progressive-realism-david-lammy. 

[7] Development Office (2024). Readout: Foreign Secretary meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister. [online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/readout-foreign-secretary-meeting-with-chinese-foreign-minister [Accessed 10 Nov. 2024]. 

[8] Waitzman, E. (2023). UK-China relations. [online] House of Lords Library. Available at: https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-china-relations/. 

[9] Yule-Smith, O. (2023). Explaining the Golden Era. [online] Engelsberg ideas. Available at: https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/explaining-the-golden-era/. 

[10] Johnson, cited in Wintour, P. (2021). Boris Johnson declares he is ‘fervently Sinophile’ as UK woos China. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/feb/21/boris-johnsons-warm-words-on-china-likely-to-infuriate-backbenchers. 

[11] Sunak, cited in Corera, G. and Grammaticas, D. (2023). China poses threat to UK way of life, says Rishi Sunak. BBC News. [online] 14 Sep. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-66810912. 

[12] Johnston, J. (2024). UK delays foreign lobbying clampdown as it works out China policy. [online] POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/united-kingdom-china-foreign-influence-registration-scheme-delay/ [Accessed 10 Nov. 2024]. 

[13] Prime Minister's Office (2024). Prime Minister Keir Starmer: ‘This is just the beginning of our relationship with the Indo-Pacific to benefit the UK’. [online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-keir-starmer-this-is-just-the-beginning-of-our-relationship-with-the-indo-pacific-to-benefit-the-uk. 

[14] Brooke-Holland, L. (2022). Integrated Review 2021: The Defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific. commonslibrary.parliament.uk. [online] Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9217/. 

[15] House of Commons Defence Committee (2023). UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific. [online] UK Parliament. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41808/documents/207298/default/. 

[16] Schadlow, cited in Casalicchio, E. (2024). Donald Trump’s heading for a showdown with the UK on China. [online] POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-uk-showdown-donald-trump-us-elections-2024-china-labour-david-lammy/ [Accessed 10 Nov. 2024].