Miscommunicating 'Peace' in the Middle East: Elite Bargains and Structural Violence

In ‘Positive Peace and the Middle East’, David Boersema characterises the Middle East in the 21st century as a time of ‘generational change’ (Boersema. D, 2011). The leaders of Syria, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates all saw overthrows and deaths of long-standing governments. In Iraq, the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein, who ruled the country since the 1970s. In Libya, in 2011, an uprising in Benghazi and Tripoli, against the 40-year rule of Muammar al-Qaddafi resulted in a civil war and foreign intervention to release political prisoners. This paper studies the aftermath of conflicts in Iraq and Libya, specifically through the potential correlation between foreign intervention in recovering state stability, and the perpetuation of structural violence in the region. I identify how post-conflict strategy suggests a miscommunication between diplomatic ideals and long-term repressive realities, and how these feed into the Iraqi healthcare system and Libyan gender-discriminatory structures. Consequently, this suggests that the security and equity of citizens is dependent on more than the traditional conduct of international diplomacy, based on knowledge-sharing in high-level environments. It requires tactical and cultural awareness of national leaders and citizens, as well as what institutions are most vulnerable to structural violence and how to mediate this. This paper ends with a brief potential direction for change but is largely concerned with the challenges that must be first overcome.  

How are elite bargains a form of miscommunication?

Political bargains in state-building are forms of miscommunication, which I define as the inability to take into account the target audience, political leadership, and cultural constraints that fall outside of immediate high political interests. Elite bargaining may consist of reinforcing embedded violence, or by perpetuating permissive violence, by providing elites preferential access to privileges (Kamrava. M, 2014). In the cases of Iraq and Libya, this aligns with the trajectory of elite capture, where elite bargains and gaps in coherent re-building strategies may reduce the level of ad hoc violence but allows elites and militia groups to monopolise peace and prevent progress (Bohm. A, 2018).  This disconnect between external and powerful internal actors, and public security in sectors such as healthcare and education, undermines the impact of diplomatic responsibility mechanisms, such as data-sharing and knowledge (Kamrava. M, 2014).  It suggests that communication is not a matter of information-giving, but requires selecting appropriate tools, ensuring accountability, and cultural understanding from overseas and regional actors.  

What is structural violence?

This paper uses the definition of structural violence formulated by John Gultang, which states it is when a government disadvantages social groups and individuals, making their actual realisation of peace and security below their expected realisation (Galtung. J, 1969). The outcome of this is that through elite decisions embedded in institutions, citizens are denied access to basic services such as healthcare, due to top-down powers displacing and repressing native populations without their consultation. As this paper reveals, structural violence is not a benign feature that is eradicated through sudden military-induced regime-change but is a long-term mechanism of elite-based power that requires substantial regional awareness and political change.  

Miscommunication in Iraq 

The element of miscommunication in Iraq stems from the 2003-2005 period, spanning the US invasion of Iraq, to the drafting of the new constitution based on the Muhasasa Ta’ifia (sectarian apportionment) power-sharing agreement (Mansour. R, PhD, 2023). The outcome of the intervention was the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime. Since the 2003 invasion, US military operations, accompanied by targeted violence by Iraqi elites, have intensified structural violence. This arises due to the segregation of ethnic communities in Shi’a and Sunni enclaves controlled by local militia or the US military. This fermenting of the sectarian division of society has sustained human rights violations and difficult access to public services such as healthcare and key state functions.  The element of ‘miscommunication’ in this case is the incoherent transition initiated by foreign powers in the suppression of the Hussein regime, of which a Gallup poll stated that 72% of American citizens favoured this outcome (Newport. F, 2003). Comparing this initial public response, to the recent statistics that despite having one of the highest national revenues ($115.7 billion in 2022) but one of the lowest life expectancies (69 years) and human development index (HDI) scores, is a testament to the weak system set up in 2005 (Skelton. M, Hussein. A.M, 2021). The internal fragmentation of the state was secondary to the abolition of the Hussein regime, yet is the primary cause of increased infant mortality, malnutrition and limited access to medical services. This suggests that ‘miscommunication’ lay in the goals-based strategy of the intervention itself. The incoherence of the post-invasion setting meant that the US allied with exiled politicians who were now unfamiliar with Iraq. This disconnect between elites and the population was a fatal act of miscommunication, which resulted in the new rulers building a Green Zone in central Baghdad, a ‘safe haven’ from the realities of the city and country (Skelton. M, Hussein. A.M, 2021).  

This Green Zone also housed diplomats, however the billions in aid from foreign countries did not reach the outside of the capital. Much of this financial aid was directed towards the security sector, which had adverse effects on the future stability of Iraq. For example, between 2003-2011, almost $20 billion was spent on rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces, the US being the lead funder. However, in 2014, this military force combined with Islamic State fighters to overtake one-third of the country, suggesting that the capacity-building approach of the security sector overlooked critical political realities (Harding. S, Libal. K 2019).  The removal of layers of the civil service has stripped Iraq of its long-standing bureaucratic muscle, leading to a breakdown of order from above. The injection of lucrative sectors, favouring individual preferences over institutions, has created competition over access to patronage resources and power competition. The impact of this runs through the vital public sectors such as healthcare, where structural violence is manifested through informal trade and medical regulation. 

The impact of miscommunication on structural violence in healthcare systems

The healthcare sector in Iraq is not only a victim of the 2003 invasion. It stems from the United Nations sanctions in the 1990s, which fostered black markets selling expensive medical equipment (Skelton. M, Hussein. A.M, 2021).  Yet the post-2003 miscommunication in Iraq’s governance intensified the role of political interests in supply-chain and quality-control mechanisms in the pharmaceutical sector. The Ministry of Health in Baghdad has been dominated by the changing hands of political factions, and exercises influence control of state-owned pharmaceutical companies and private vendors, which generate procurements between the public and private sector to maximise the profits of private and ruling entities (Dr Mansoud, R 2022). The outcome is the scarcity of critical drugs and medical equipment. This both reduces access to lifesaving medicines and increases the dangers of the use of equipment. For example, as Mac Skelton et al reveal, poorly maintained medical devices and oxygen tanks during COVID-19 had led to hospital fires in April and July 2021 in Nasiriya and Baghdad. The mechanism through which Iraq faces these healthcare concerns lies in the disconnect, as aforementioned, between political parties and citizens. Emerging parties, armed with Green Zone funding and delegation of duty from US officials, take control of the medical procurement process and inflate profits through over-valuing prescriptions and under-delivering the service (Dr Mansoud, R 2022).   

This is further emphasised through the informal trade of pharmaceuticals at borders. Quality controls at borders in Baghdad, which are designed to guarantee the safety of medicines and equipment, are bypassed to protect the profits of politically connected importers. This involvement of the Iraqi elite in competing over the informal trade in medicine through reliance on non-interference and medicines licensed by the Ministry of Health, has lost the Iraqi governmental institutions $10 billion per year (5% of GDP), due to fees ending up at political parties rather than in use for public services.  Despite attempts at reform, such as the Border Ports Law in 2016 to curb smuggling by matching the identification of the imported consignment before being released to the beneficiary, seizures of goods remain sporadic as the policy does not target the whole of the supply chain, but rather targets frontline providers (Skelton. M, Hussein. A.M, 2021). Political parties and armed groups may deposit profits in Beirut banks and make deals with doctors and pharmacists in Turkey and Jordan. Therefore, profits are not recorded in government systems which can be scrutinised by legal measures (Al-Aloosy, M 2021).  Iraqi elites have benefitted from the surface-level intervention of foreign powers, thus allowing violence to perpetrate throughout the entire medical supply chain. This is one example of how ‘miscommunication’ between powers in the post-conflict era can lead to a lack of formal mechanisms, and creation of fragmented groups with vested political interest, which ultimately impact the health security of the population. 

Libya 

A similar case is witnessed in Libya, where the outcome of post-conflict miscommunication has resulted in the de facto partition of eastern and northwestern Libya. The period between the demise of the Quadhafi regime (2011) and the conflicts of 2014 civil war, contained no rules governing access to state resources (Lacher. W, 2018). In 2015, the United Nations attempted to broker an agreement (the Skhirat agreement) yet failed to unify state institutions. The creation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) did not succeed in gaining regular access to budgets and military command structure. This has resulted in the maintenance of the pre-2011 dispersal of state arsenals and armed groups who controlled strategic assets and exerted influence over governmental structures. Moreover, in October 2020, the UN attempted to unite warring Libyan factions to agree to a conditional ceasefire and withdraw foreign mercenaries including the United Arab Emirates and Russia, a response to the movement launched by the eastern Libyan Armed Forces / Libyan National Army, to wrest control of the capital, Tripoli, from the GNA. The UN gathered members of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) to create a new political roadmap for the seating of the temporary Government of National Unity (GNU) in December 2021 (Lacher. W, 2018). However, Libyans have not adopted the new constitution, and it is likely that future administrations will compete for influence.  

The central point of miscommunication in Libya is the post 2011-14 gap between the political efforts of foreign countries such as the US, and the realities that have emerged on the ground. For example, On November 24, 2021, a U.S. official told the U.N. Security Council that the United States would “support a Libya-led process that reflects the maximum consensus achievable in the time allowed,” (Congressional Research Service 2022). The US recognises the Libyan refugee crisis, weapons stockpiles, and ideological fragmentation. There has also been tangible evidence of intervention to recover Libya’s security, including the November 2021 statement by US officials that “individuals or entities, inside or outside of Libya, who might attempt to obstruct, undermine, manipulate or falsify the electoral process and the political transition will be held accountable and may be designated by the United Nations Sanctions Committee in accordance with UNSC resolution 2571 (2021),” (Congressional Research Service 2022).  An Action Plan was agreed in October 2021 for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign offices, which was welcomed by the US government and European partners to restore the “sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,” (Congressional Research Service 2022). However, these initiatives have not targeted the internal, structural violence that reaches across regions and social groups. The LAAF remains a dominant political and economic actor, and in the west, four armed groups have consolidated control over Tripoli. Many military groups are dependent on Turkish-supplied forces, and since the 2011 conflicts, have sought territory and influence from state and security bodies, which prevents a strong ruling coalition that can curb the abilities of the amalgamation of Libyan militia groups (Eaton. T 2021).  

The implication is that without a defined foreign strategy that is aware of the internal military fragmentation of Libya, efforts of western and middle eastern governments have bypassed the mechanisms of stability. Whilst the US did identify points of conflict and impose sanctions, it did not recognise that militia groups in Libya are not a network, but an amalgamation; a single strategy would not be effective. This has negative impacts on women, as will be explored in the further section.  

Women in the shadows of armed militias

The presence of militia groups has impacted the physical and economic security of women in Libya, as employment and mobility opportunities are reduced. The establishment of LAAF in cities has, as an interview for Chatham House states, reduced the trust and security of the region (Eaton. T 2021). Whilst their presence affects all areas of society, young women are often targeted by militia groups in university settings, asked to complete relational favours in exchange for administrative help. Yet this is not only limited to women; a young male student, Abir from Tripoli University, stated that ‘In order to get a security approval for me to travel, my brother had to say I was going for a health treatment and my family was picking me up on the other side [of the Libyan-Egyptian border],’ (Ramali. K, Eaton. T, 2020).  

The masculinised role of militias, who present themselves as protectors to the female population, has reduced the economic access for women during times of crisis such as the pandemic. For example, in the absence of income, 52% of UN survey respondents indicated increased pressure due to the accumulation of rent and the ability to meet basic needs. 70% of women claimed they were not self-reliant in visiting healthcare clinics, which is exacerbated by the statistic that 23% of the sample emphasising the long distances to medical centres, and the difficulty in using public transport in militia-occupied regions (Ramali. K, Eaton. T, 2020). 

The implication is that structural violence in Libya seeps below the state authorities, into local conflict groups which act as the region’s protectors. Several factors affect the degree of gendered structural violence across Libya, such as the function of Tribal structures and emphasis on early marriage (Khalifa. A, 2017).  However, as I have suggested, the miscommunication of social restructuring after the 2011 civil war, between Libyan elites and foreign groups in both the west and Middle East, has perhaps not caused but entrenched gender-based structural violence.  

The incoherence of the rebuilding of Libya’s government in the post-2014 period by western and middle eastern governments has reinforced the internal insecurity that women have faced in the region. For example, in a Chatham House interview, a female Libyan resident stated that the increase in online monitoring by militias has solidified the lack of trust that women feel when governed by local, unfamiliar groups (Ramali. K, Eaton. T, 2020). The policing of public morals, and the political extremities between the LAAF and the GNA, is a self-reinforcing mirror of the weak outcome of the civil war. Without an understanding of how the most vulnerable in society may be impacted from top-down policy, the result is a fatal miscommunication of the concept of ‘re-building’ and ‘regime-change’.  

Conclusion 

This article has explored the gaps in the political reconstruction of Iraq and Libya, arguing that the negative realities on healthcare and gendered systems stem from the miscommunication of foreign intervention in re-building a post-conflict state. Democracies are not built through coercion on a Lockean tabula rasa, but both external and national actors must concentrate on legitimising power structures that maintain the core of a nation’s needs; the needs of its citizens. As Mehran Kamrava argues in Beyond the Arab Spring, this fundamentally flawed nature of ruling bargains in the Middle East has sustained the links between top-down repression with the general practice of politics (Kamrava. M, 2014).  This implicit bargain shaping politics has caused citizens to surrender their social rights to the government, and in some cases, this has become embedded in the political structure. The emphasis on external actors additionally shows that they must consider the measurable effects of their intervention on the security and well-being of populations, through a deeper understanding of the existing systemic weaknesses of states and its consequences on the wider population. Elite bargains and high-level diplomacy may miss the mark, by neglecting open discussions on how political interests of international competition and trade may complement a secure, equitable Middle Eastern population. As Gerald Feierstein of the Middle East Institute argues, ‘enhancing the scope and frequency of diplomatic engagement cannot, in itself, reverse the deterioration in U.S. relations with its Gulf partners,’ (Feierstein. G, 2022). Nor can it tap into the underlying significant systemic concerns of Iraqi and Libyan society. There is a need for trans-national strategic consultation and coordination that involves a discursive, empathetic approach to foreign affairs, to ensure the social security of Iraq and Libya.