Nihon Hidankyo and the Politics of Pacifism
Yuki Hoshi (she/they) is a third year International Social and Political Studies student, with a specialism in International Relations and Spanish language. She is currently writing her dissertation on sociolinguistic perspectives on political discourse.
Introduction
On the 10th of October 2024, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that this year’s Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Japanese organisation Nihon Hidankyo for their efforts in campaigning against the use of nuclear weapons and the promotion of world peace [14]. The grassroots organisation is dedicated to elevating the voices of victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, known in Japanese as hibakusha, and was founded in 1952 [12]. Notedly, as the NNC points out in their press release, next year will mark the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII [12]. Primary source testimonies such as that of the hibakusha play an important role in how we approach our understanding of history–and in turn, the way in which we approach the future. As such, the narratives and norms shaped by a nation’s history are key to understanding its behaviour on the international stage [4]. But as international conflict continues, with Putin’s Russia continuing to invade Ukraine and North Korea testing intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Japan sea, concerns over a nuclear war return to the horizon [3]. Japan now finds itself facing an identity crisis of sorts, between succumbing to international pressures to remilitarize or to maintain its anti-war cultural norms. This analysis centres on Japan’s complex relationship to nuclear weapons, and its own pacifist identity.
Japanese Pacifism vs Normalisation
As the only country in history to have ever been victim to the use of nuclear weapons in an act of warfare, it should come as no surprise that Japan is a widely anti-nuclear country [10]. In an effort to promote peace in a post-WWII society, peace education in Japanese school curricula seeks to expose Japanese students to pacifist ideology [10]. This narrative is largely characterised by a sense of “victimhood” by the Japanese people at the hands of the United States and the greater consequences of warfare. However, the discourse of “victimhood,” some argue, alleviates the Japanese government of its moral responsibility for the war crimes committed by the imperialist forces during the war on Japan’s neighbouring countries. Most notably, this is visible in the longstanding “textbook controversy”, sparking heated debate both domestically and internationally over how to accurately depict Japan’s role in the consequences of WWII [10]. But how does the peace curriculum and these nuclear memories shape Japan’s public opinion on foreign policy today? The establishment of these norms of peace via cultural means such as education, media, and entertainment, has created a national identity around this pacifist or anti-militaristic culture [5]. There are also legal limitations against Japan that bar it from normalisation. As it currently stands Japan does not have a standing military, but instead a “Self-Defense Force”–as Japan was barred from its right to maintain war potential following Article 9 of its US written post-WWII constitution [5]. Article 9 has caused much debate both domestically and internationally, regarding whether Japan’s constitution has done more harm or good on the international stage by limiting its military capabilities [5]. In 2015, the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe attempted to circumvent the limitations of the constitution and passed a series of controversial security bills that expanded the powers of the SDFs. While these bills passed, they were met with significant protest–a rare occurrence in Japanese social customs [13]. As such, we can understand Japanese public opinion to be largely characterised by constructivist norm dynamics [4], rather than the more traditional realist approach of the LDP themselves. Even as calls for remilitarisation continue, Japan’s pacifist national identity do present an interesting alternative to understanding international dynamics post WWII.
Japan’s Nuclear Policy
Much like Japan’s complex relationship to its SDF, it seems that their nuclear policies may not be as clear cut as one might think as well. The Japanese government has repeatedly spoken in favour of non-proliferation and denuclearisation at various summits and fora, and notably hosted the G7 summit in Hiroshima in 2022 whilst calling for nuclear disarmament [9]. And yet in the same year Japanese officials chose not to attend the first meeting of states parties to the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), nor have they ratified the treaty [8]. The government’s resistance to joining the TPNW over the years has not only caused anger from hibakusha themselves, but a large percentage of the general public [1]. A 2017 public opinion survey found that 75% of Japanese people believed that Japan should join the TPNW, demonstrating a clear contrast in government policy and the beliefs of the general public [8]. But why would Japan not wish to join the TPNW if they so clearly push for non-proliferation? The answer lies in their closest military ally, the United States. It appears that under Fumio Kishida’s government, officials were concerned about damaging ties with the United States, had they joined the TPNW despite expressing verbal support for the treaty [8]. Especially in the face of North Korea’s alleged nuclear power not so far away, Japan directly benefits from (albeit controversially [2]) stationed US military soldiers, and the power that US nuclear missiles hold in keeping the international balance of mutually assured destruction if any nuclear power were to someday launch an attack [6]. Consequently, given that Japan cannot depend exclusively on its own military powers, its strategic reliance on US hegemony does not allow for its government to act on its own calls for nuclear proliferation as much as one might anticipate given the nation’s history.
Conclusion
In summary, Nihon Hidankyo’s Nobel Peace Prize award underscores the lasting and complex impact of nuclear memory on contemporary Japanese nuclear policy and its national pacifist identity. Japan's unique position as the only nation to have experienced nuclear attacks deeply informs its peace-oriented identity, which is cultivated through education, media, and a constitutionally grounded aversion to military engagement. This pacifist stance, however, is nuanced by Japan's strategic reliance on U.S. military support, particularly amid increasing nuclear threats in its region. As Japan navigates these competing forces—its commitment to peace, its historical victimhood, and its geopolitical alliances—its approach to nuclear policy remains marked by ambivalence. In honouring Nihon Hidankyo, the international community is reminded of the urgency in preserving the memory of nuclear devastation and fostering a collective pursuit of disarmament. By remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their efforts to elevate the voices of hibakusha not only keeps the past alive but also influences the global vision for a future free from the shadow of nuclear warfare.
Works Cited
[1] Akechi, J. and Kobayashi, K. (2022). First Meeting of States Parties to TPNW: Hiroshima’s A-bomb survivors and youth group express anger and disappointment over Japan’s absence. [online] 中国新聞ヒロシマ平和メディアセンター. Available at: https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=122833.
[2] Aljazeera (2024). Japan protests alleged sex assault cases involving US military in Okinawa. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/28/japan-protests-alleged-sex-assault-cases-involving-us-military-in-okinawa.
[3] Bertrand, N. (2024). North Korea likely to ask for nuclear technology from Russia in exchange for troops, South Korea says. [online] CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/30/politics/north-korea-russia-nuclear-technology-troops/index.html.
[4] Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4), pp.887–917.
[5] Gustafsson, K., Hagström, L. and Hanssen, U. (2019). Long live pacifism! Narrative power and Japan’s pacifist model. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(4), pp.502–520. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623174.
[6] Hirata, K. (2024). Who Shapes the National Security Debate? Divergent Interpretations of Japan’s Security Role. Asian Affairs: An American Review. [online] doi:https://doi.org/10.3200//AAFS.35.3.123-151.
[7] Hook, G.D. (1987). Evolution of the Anti-Nuclear Discourse in Japan. Current Research on Peace and Violence, [online] 10(1), pp.32–43. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40725055.
[8] ICAN (n.d.). Japan. [online] ICAN. Available at: https://www.icanw.org/japan.
[9] JapanGov (2023). Japan’s Long Efforts to Realize a World Without Nuclear Weapons. [online] The Government of Japan - JapanGov -. Available at: https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2023/09/world_without_nuclear_weapons.html.
[10] Machida, S. (2020). War memories and Japanese citizens’ views toward the self-defense forces. Contemporary Japan, 33(1), pp.24–40. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/18692729.2020.1852369.
[11] Mannitz, S. (2024). Imagine All the People: Peace requires transnational remembrance Peace requires transnational remembrance on JSTOR. Jstor.org. [online] doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep28544.
[12] NobelPrize.org (2024). The Nobel Peace Prize 2024. [online] NobelPrize.org. Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2024/press-release/.
[13] Osaki, T. (1970). Thousands protest Abe, security bills at Diet rally. [online] The Japan Times. Available at: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/30/national/thousands-protest-abe-security-bills-diet-rally/#.XWlDF0d7laR [Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].
[14] Reuters (2024). Who are Japan’s Nobel Peace Prize winners Nihon Hidankyo? [online] Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/who-are-japans-nobel-peace-prize-winners-nihon-hidankyo-2024-10-11/.
