RUSSIAN REVIVAL - HOW IS THE KREMLIN USING CULTURAL DIPLOMACY TO EXPAND ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE?

''The greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” declared President Vladimir Putin in reference to the dissolution of the Soviet Union from 1988-1991; he explained that for the Russian people, “it became a genuine tragedy ... [as] millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.” Are we now seeing the Second Gathering of the Russian Lands? Cultural diplomacy has long been recognised as an underestimated, yet highly effective weapon states can wield to enact their foreign policy objectives and the largest nation on Earth is no exception. The Federation’s aim to maintain influence over regions formerly under its predecessor’s direct control is no secret, and cultural diplomacy is one complex, fascinating and strategic method by which they hope to achieve it. When Putin created the Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2007, he announced its purpose, to promote “the Russian language, as ... a significant aspect of Russian and world culture,” though it became clear that there was less of a globalist motive behind its establishment. The Foundation aims to promote a sense of community amongst the Russophone diaspora across the world, most notably in the former USSR. Far from being an independent institution intent on sharing the nuances of Russian culture, the fact that the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, federal agency head, Konstatin Kosachev, and top Russian Orthodox Church representative, Gregory Alfeev, sit on its board of trustees indicates its direct connection to the Kremlin.

Moreover, Kosachev leads no ordinary federal agency, but the Rossotrudnichestvo, or

agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and

International Humanitarian Cooperation. Do not be misled – humanitarian protecting human rights. The Rossotrudnichestvo, armed with the nominally- cooperation tends to mean cultural and scientific collaboration in Russian, rather than independent Russkiy Mir Foundation, has embarked on a mission to promote a positive Eastern Europe including eight in Ukraine, four in Moldova, and three each in Bulgaria image of the Federation, with “centres” established across the globe, the majority in and Poland. The organisations promote Russian-language schools where knowledge of 2011, stating that the Foundation is a “proxy body that represents nothing less than a it has declined and popularises Orthodoxy and pan-Slavic ideals as according to Blitt,

fusion of Orthodox and state institutions”. However, how has the Kremlin deployed

them and used its wider powers to expand its sphere of influence?

LITTLE GREEN MEN

On 27 February 2014, Russian security forces occupied the Crimean parliament a 97% majority voted in favour of union with Russia in a controversial referendum, building as it held an emergency session and voted to terminate the government. After Crimea was annexed in an act that shocked the world. Despite the sanctions and leaders – the conundrum that their widespread condemnation opposed the will of the passionate rhetoric that followed, a perplexing notion lingered in the minds of Western Crimean people, who showed an intense fervour for the transfer of territory. So how did this happen?

The Revolution of Dignity also called the Euromaidan Revolution, ousted President Viktor Yanukovych after he postponed the signing of an association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. When a parliamentary vote of 328-to-0 relieved him of the presidency, Yanukovych requested Russian aid – defending him, Moscow declared his overthrow a coup and supported the counter-protests in eastern and southern Ukraine. The polarisation of the Bread Basket of Europe was never clearer. Interim President Arseniy Yatsenyuk signed the association agreement and his elected successor, the “Chocolate King” oligarch, Petro Poroshenko committed to modernising Ukraine along EU lines – simultaneously, pro-Russian, eastern Ukrainian separatists declared the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and counter-protests in Crimea escalated significantly.

Crimea has always held a special place within a larger Slavic identity and is even considered a quasi-sacred location. Moreover, it has always had a strong sense of regional identity; for instance, a 2013 study reported that when asked where their homeland was, the majority of residents responded Crimea before Ukraine or Russia. Nevertheless, the schism with Russia during the death of the Soviet Union created unresolved issues. On 1st December 1991, whilst the Ukrainian independence referendum attracted a 91% majority nationally, there was only a 54% majority in Crimea. Russian efforts helped build a strong base of supporters, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation continued this process: they promoted the Russian language over Ukrainian and undermined the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (based in Kyiv) by popularising the Russian one. Coupled with local movements, this led to a widely held view of Russia as a panacea to their socioeconomic troubles.

Fast-forward to the invasion of the little green men, or unidentified Russian soldiers in February 2014 backing local Berkut riot police in occupying the Isthmus of Perekop and Chonhar Peninsula, effectively cutting Crimea off from the rest of Ukraine and proceeding to allegedly hold parliamentarians at gunpoint whilst they dissolved the Kyiv-backed government in Sevastopol. Protecting the Russophone population was central to the justification of the annexation – according to Sergei Aksyonov (before his ascension to the Crimean premiership), it was his priority to defend the Russophone community’s human rights. Evidence of Russia’s successful soft power came in a 2014 survey that recorded a 5% annual increase in Crimeans in favour of a Russian-Ukrainian merger. Notably, ethnic Ukrainians were not necessarily anti- annexation – the greatest divide was between Tatars and ethnic Russians, owing to the horrifying repression of the Tatar community during Soviet times. Language and culture had divided a peninsula that became a microcosm for the whole nation still trapped in conflict today. Crimea demonstrates that the Kremlin treats cultural diplomacy as a weapon equally powerful as the PKP machine guns it provides its soldiers and recognises its place in its foreign policy.

MOLDOVA’S BESSARABIAN NIGHTS

Moldova lies on a fault line between pro-Russian and pro-European spheres, and we can see the effects when the political ground shakes. An example of this is the country’s recent presidential election which also allows us to assess Moscow’s cultural diplomacy towards Moldova.

For almost 500 years, the nation in Bessarabia had not existed as an independent state, prior to the USSR’s dissolution. Following that, pro-Moscow, ethnic Russian separatists established a breakaway state in the west of the country, Transdniestria. The presence of Russian “peacekeepers” in Moldova has long been a source of controversy as has the Kremlin’s influence over the government, both the primary one in Chisinau and the separatist one in Tiraspol. Since 1944, it was Soviet policy to virulently repress any connection to Romania particularly amongst the Moldovan Romanophone population, even converting the script into Cyrillic. Despite independence and the reintroduction of the Latin script, divided loyalties persisted and erupted in a literal division of the state. Since the early 1990s, Russia has maintained close ties with Transdniestria. Since long-time leader Igor Smirnov’s retirement, Moscow has provided Tiraspol with a prime minister – yet, it refuses to recognise the breakaway region as an independent state to use it against Chisinau when necessary, thus perpetuating the so-called “frozen conflict”.

More broadly, Russian media predominates throughout the nation. Most films, TV shows, concerts, news, arts, and other media outlets are in the Russian language primarily due to the general absence of any independent Moldovan media but also due to the Federation’s greater technological abilities. Despite a 1994 agreement to collaborate on arts, music, youth exchanges, scientific research, Russia’s cultural diplomacy has not yet found a smooth transition to political control, hence its tortured support for Transdniestria and Gagauzia (another pro-Russian breakaway state in Moldova’s south led by ethnic Turks). For instance, though it supplies Transdniestria with free energy, it charges Moldova. As 30% of Moldovan GDP comes from remittances, the ~500,000 migrants in Russia are often used as leverage when dealing with Chisinau.

Moldova, however, has tended to resist Russia’s methods of wielding influence. For example, in 2014 the pro-Russian Partidul Noastru (“Our Party”) was banned though its leader Renato Usatii, connected to Vladimir Yakunin, the Russian Railways chief, was still elected mayor of Balti. After Russia intervened in Donbas, tensions escalated: Moldova expelled five embassy officials for espionage, and a January 2018 law was passed directed at curtailing Russian media presence. Perhaps the greatest example of Russia’s waning cultural influence was the election of Maia Sandu by a 58% majority in November 2020, for though the defeat of pro-Russian Igor Dodon was not an explicit attack on Moscow. Rather a response to the endemic corruption plaguing the state, it demonstrates that no matter how great the Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy may be, a national desire for change cannot be repressed.

The Great Game was a high-stakes, political competition between the British and Russian Empires in the nineteenth century for influence over Central Asia. Now, more than 100 years later, diplomatic confrontation has returned to the region, but things have changed drastically.

Razhmezhevanie, a Soviet territorial delimiting policy in the 1920s established the nations of Central Asia as we would come to know them following their independence in the early 1990s. The USSR’s successor has striven to maintain their influence over the region and use cultural diplomacy, amongst other tools, to achieve this. Working in their favour is the fact that the new states inherited Soviet-era institutions and leaders, and that their troublesome transition to market economies was marked by a dependency on exporting natural resources, placing Russia close to, if not at the top of their list of trading partners. However, around thirty years have passed since independence, so has Russian influence kept up?

Sentiments of the Federation’s “imperialistic behaviour” amongst Central Asian populations has forced Moscow to avoid the more aggressive approach it would take in the Baltics or Ukraine and focus on cultural exchanges, primarily educational programmes. However, Russia has competition. The EU, Turkey, China, Iran, and others have recognised opportunities in the region, and thus a cultural cold war has developed. Under the umbrella of EU National Institutes for Culture, numerous organisations have worked to build relations with Central Asian states including, but not limited to, the: British Council, running English courses and supporting the “WeAlmaty” project intent on developing Almaty, Kazakhstan into a “smart city”; Alliance Française, teaching French and arranging cultural exhibitions on history, art, music and food; Goethe-Institut, teaching German and sharing theatre, radio and newspapers; Zlata, raising awareness of Bulgarian art and music; and, three Houses of Polish Culture too.

Unanimous membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Türksoy has seen Turkey increase its presence by promoting Turkish-language schools across the region using the slogan “Brotherhood of Turkish Nations”. Ankara has also financed several higher education institutes such as the successful Manas University in Bishkek. Even Iran has launched state-operated media outlets in Tajikistan. Russia has responded with not only the Rossotrudnichestvo and Russkiy Mir centres, but also the Pushkin Institute, Gosfilmofond and Russian Academy of Arts to share its culture. Despite all programmes though, higher education is still the grand prize – it is the opportunity to win over the next generation of leaders. Consequently, Russia has directed its universities to specifically take in more Central Asian students and has worked to exploit their advantage of the Russian-language presence in these communities.

Ultimately, the most important question is how these cultural efforts have been received. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, prior to his nominal resignation to the status of Elbasy, developed a multi-vector policy to escape any one nation’s sphere of influence and balance both Russian and Western interests; for Kazakhstan, this came from a desire to hold political clout matching its vast oil reserves. A cultural manifestation of “multi-vectorism” is the transformation of the Kazakh script from Cyrillic to Latin scheduled for 2025, symbolic of a step away from Moscow. Despite this, though, elites in Nur-Sultan remain Russophiles, and the Russian language is still promoted in educational institutions (e.g. the Miras military academy where the course can be taught in either Russian and Kazakh or Russian and English). Similarly, Tajikistan has opted for the balanced approach especially considering early instability delayed the establishment of relations with Western powers; in 2009, it prepared a bill to remove Russian as the inter-ethnic lingua franca, though it is still seen as closer to Moscow than the West. Kyrgyzstan demonstrates a clear pro-Russian orientation especially amongst the political elites, and the lack of a visible EU presence (despite the foreign aid it provides) helps to enforce this; it should be noted that popular dissent is still prevalent, particularly in Bishkek, though this is typically due to domestic issues rather than foreign alliances. Despite cultural differences, all three remain associated with the Eurasian Economic Union, Moscow’s unfruitful attempt to provide a counterweight to the EU’s customs union.

Tashkent has promoted mustaqillik (self-reliance) in Uzbek foreign policy over the last decade and has acknowledged the foreign aid it receives from the EU. Notwithstanding this, however, Uzbekistan hosts divisions of prestigious Russian institutions such as the Moscow State University of Lomonosov and the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. Though President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has stressed Turkmenistan’s special relations with Russia, local elites in Ashgabat remain suspicious of Moscow’s actions. The Turkmen government, in particular, has proven particularly adept at playing nations off each other by engaging with both the United States and Russia on trade and commercial relationships respectively. This non-alignment strategy of exploiting competition for influence could be something that more Central Asian nations adopt.

Overall, EDB Barometers surveying people across all countries in the region show an overall preference for cultural and educational exchanges with Russia over the EU but have given some indication of waning influence particularly as other attractive countries are mentioned such as Turkey, India and China.

DRAGON VS BEAR

China, the hitherto silent superpower has exploded onto the political stage, initiating a cold war with the United States and pursuing its Silk Road Economic Belt initiative with frightening determination. Lying at the centre of that plan is Central Asia. Hence Russia’s biggest opponent, posing a threat even larger than that of the EU, in maintaining influence through cultural diplomacy is the People’s Republic. Communist vs Ex-communist. China has fortified ties and trade links with most Central Asian states to protect its security, energy and economic interests. However, there remains strong anti-China fear throughout the region hence the People’s Republic’s pursuit of cultural diplomacy – they have: opened Confucius Institutes, increased local media coverage in the indigenous languages, provided soft loans, and organised Cultural Exchange Forums. The economic enticement of relations with Beijing is too good for most governments to resist, but there are nonetheless significant problems that Moscow will no doubt attempt to exacerbate, that is if they have not been already. Firstly, there are large Uighur populations across the region; therefore, concentration camps and alleged genocide in Xinjiang causes serious concern. Second, locals find it difficult to access independent information and receive unbiased facts. Finally, the fear of alienation and fifth columnists is quite prevalent with one Tajik study reporting that people believed Chinese workers in hospitals, restaurants, intentionally do not speak the language to reserve those services for Chinese people, a fear that is no doubt music to Moscow’s ears. Despite this, the growing number of students drawn to China will pose a significant long-term threat to the Kremlin’s thus far successful strategy in Central Asia.

THE UNION STATE

When Svetlana Tikhanovskaya fled to Lithuania in August 2020 after her children’s

safety was threatened by President Alexander Lukashenko’s administration, the

democratic protest movement could have very well fallen apart. However, it did not.

The people continued to resist Belarus’ dictator. Despite the KGB’s violent arrests and

kidnappings of opposition leaders, the people are continuing to resist. So what does the

view of Minsk look like from the Kremlin? And how will Moscow adapt its cultural

diplomacy strategy accordingly?

Your history is fake. Since the early 1990s, Russian propagandists have attempted to

convince the people that independent Belarusian history, culture and identity are not

real and that even their language is just a “corrupted” version of Russian, in one of the most extreme cultural, diplomatic policies the ex-USSR has pursued. The gradual takeover has enabled this modern Russification process by Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir and the Gorchakov Fund of Belarus’ media during the past two decades.Western negligence has also led to Belarus being encompassed in Russian cyberspace, making disinformation easier to spread. The Kremlin’s narrative revolves around Soviet glory, Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism with a 2018 study reporting 25% of people believe the source of their statehood is the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, double those in 2009. The youth, with no memory of the USSR, are fed pro-Russian ideas through educational events such as the Union League of Debates. Finally, that only 3% of the population speak Belarusian daily and the rest use Russian is a significant victory for Moscow.

Yet, 77% hold a positive or neutral image of the EU, and despite the 1996 Union State agreement, only 12.4% support a merger. Moreover, the people calling for democracy on the streets also represents a threat to Russia’s political and cultural hold over the nation. So what is the Kremlin’s plan? The secret Sochi agreement between Lukashenko and Putin nominally called for constitutional reform in Belarus though this is widely seen as the inception of a Moscow-friendly, managed the transition of power, out of Lukashenko’s hands which have been long-awaited by the Kremlin. Ultimately, handing power to the pro-democracy youth risks undermining Russia’s cultural degradation policy and use of Belarus as a buffer state between it and NATO/EU and is therefore not an option. However, the more people that wave the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian Democratic Republic from before Nazi or Soviet takeover, the weaker Moscow’s cultural diplomacy strategy becomes.

BACK TO THE USSR?

Federica Mogherini, and EU High Representative, once said that “culture is a powerful tool to build bridges between people ... against those trying to divide us.” Cultural diplomacy should be used to bring people together on both the intranational and international stages, but unfortunately many nations, including the Russian Federation, use it to divide and rule. It does not always work as has been noted but never does any good when it is used for a unilateral geopolitical gain. Putin is trying to rebuild the Soviet Union in everything, but name yet faces an unsurmountable obstacle: free will. Political and economic diplomacy will always grab the headlines, in one sense, because they are more straightforward and more logical than cultural diplomacy. The latter is a complex, long-term strategy that only the greatest chess grandmasters can wield effectively, and as we have seen: Russia always knows how to play the game.