The “War on Terror” Frame
Kian Ann Tan
Tan Kian Ann is a second year BSc Politics and International Relations student, with an interest in uncovering the nuance behind on-going policies and individual agendas.
When was the last time a formal declaration of war was issued by a great power? Not since the end of WWII, from which the 1949 Geneva Convention emerged. With the proliferation of the newly codified law of war, which generated significant costs to its compliance (e.g., bureaucratic training, strategic disadvantages, etc.) and noncompliance, the incentives for states to declare war declined (Fazal, 2012). Yet a semblance of this archaic tradition emerged from the ashes of the September 11 attacks - Bush's Global War on Terror.
However, there are three essential reasons why declaring war against terrorism is distinct from a conventional war declaration. Firstly, the former involves a constantly evolving notion of "the enemy." While the War on Terror was initially defined by Bush as involving "al-Qaeda" and "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated," it was later expanded in the Iraq war to include "tyrants with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and rogue regimes" (Dunn, 2005). From the continued introduction of new "enemies," it can be argued that the War on Terror was not a "war" that the US actively sought out an "end" to. Secondly, while formal wars may be resolved by "negotiated settlements," the War on Terror emphasises the principle of "non-negotiation with terrorists," where negotiatin
g with terrorists would further fuel and legitimise terrorist acts and aims (Briggs & Wallace, 2022). Thirdly, while formal war declarations fall within the repertoire of traditional state behaviour, the War on Terror was an act of innovation; a normative framing attempt that emerged under the unique circumstances of 9/11. What drove the employment of the War on Terror frame, and how was it developed? To what extent was it efficacious, and has it created unintended consequences? Before delving into these questions, it is necessary to briefly establish the normative context of 9/11.
Aftermath of 9/11: A Brief Normative Context
An affective wave across the international community was observed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. European news media communicated a strong sense of sympathy and solidarity, as can be observed by Le Monde's September 12 proclamation "Nous sommes tous Americains"; "We are all Americans" (Sloan, 2011). Then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair was particularly overt in his displays of sympathy, personally visiting the United States shortly after the attacks (Hall & Ross, 2015). Within 24 hours of the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring that the 9/11 attack was to be regarded as an attack against all 19 NATO allies (Bailey, 2004).
This affective wave created a window of opportunity for Bush to characterise his War on Terror. Esch (2010) points out how the rhetoric of Bush's speeches was an attempt to construct a political myth of "civilisation v. barbarism"; "Us vs Them". This can be observed from the following speech excerpts: "We haven't seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time … this is a new kind of - a new kind of evil (16 Sept 2001)"; "...they hate our values, they hate what America stands for (13 Sept 2001)" (ibid.). Reese & Lewis (2009) describe how US journalists further played a role in reifying the War on Terror frame in their lack of contestation against Bush's terminologies, repeating his catchphrases, and conveying Bush's policy as "America's policy." The War on Terror frame thus cascaded rapidly and effectively in the domestic realm in the initial months after 9/11 - to the extent that more than 90% of Americans surveyed would support sending large numbers of troops into Afghanistan (Shortridge, 2021).
The Bush Doctrine - Driving Forces
The years leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq saw the further development of the War on Terror frame via the "Bush Doctrine." Under the assumption of "American Exceptionalism," the Bush doctrine was a diagnostic frame that advocated for the US to take "unilateral action" against terror through "preventative war" and "regime change" (Jervis, 2003). The doctrine, therefore, justified the Iraq invasion, where the desire to topple Saddam's regime became assimilated under the War on Terror umbrella (Dunn, 2005).
Upon first glance, it may be pointed out that the Bush doctrine was developed for the sake of expediency - to subvert internationally enforced jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the pursuit of its national interests (e.g., energy, the protection of Israel, counterterrorism, etc.) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Jaigirdar, 2021). On the one hand, the US attempted to legitimise the Iraq invasion by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises that states have an "inherent right to use force in self-defence in the face of an armed attack"; under the War on Terror frame, Iraq was linked to the 9/11 attacks (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005). On the other hand, by using the "terrorist" label to delegitimize its enemy, the US has further argued that the International Humanitarian Law was "obsolete" in the detainment of captured "terrorists" (such as the detainees of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp), under the argument that were "unlawful combatants" that are not entitled to "Prisoner of War" status (Greenwood, 2002; Kim, 2004).
On a deeper level, however, the Bush doctrine may be argued as a hegemonic attempt to project US power globally. Under the War on Terror and "American Exceptionalism," only the US could be viewed as a legitimate "liberating force" in the "global crusade for democracy"; the only freedom that can be promoted globally is freedom that aligns with American-defined values (Hendrickson & Tucker, 2005). Therefore, the Bush doctrine may be interpreted as a US attempt to define international rules and norms and dominate the post-Cold War world order. The US desire for hegemony is evidenced by the 1992 "Defense Policy Guidance," which emphasised a preventative strategy of "convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture" and "discouraging (advanced industrial nations) from challenging our leadership" (Dunmire, 2009). It may be argued that the Bush Doctrine was not a product of the unique circumstance of 9/11 - instead, it was an application of a grand, post-Cold War realist strategy.
Short Run: Norms Cascade?
Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) propose a "norm life cycle" framework where norm entrepreneurs seek to push norms past a "tipping point," beyond which new norms "cascade" and are adopted rapidly through an active process of socialisation. It was likely that Bush had attempted to do the same with the War on Terror frame - to leverage 9/11 as a "tipping point" to generate a "rally-round-the-flag" effect; the Bush doctrine would thus be considered effective in the short run if members of the international community become socialised to automatically support and appraise the US leadership in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, however, this would have been particularly difficult to achieve, considering the context of an initial European distrust and discontent toward the Bush administration before the 9/11 attacks, where frequent transatlantic fights over a range of issues (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, etc.) was giving rise to a mainstream view that the US and Europe were "headed for divorce" (Peterson, 2001).
In reality, while a worldwide coalition involving hundreds of countries had indeed been assembled under the War on Terror to support the US in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanism) and global counterterrorism, several allies retained divided perspectives beneath the surface regarding the promotion of a "war mentality" and the nature of the US unilateral approach (Sloan, 2011). These disagreements were particularly highlighted in the Iraq War - most Europeans were sceptical of the conclusions reached by the Bush Administration regarding Saddam's links to international terrorism; France threatened to use the UN Security Council veto against the US decision to invade Iraq, under the fear of setting a "precedent" where the Security Council would merely serve as a "rubber stamp for American policy" (ibid.; Tardy, 2003).
While one may point out Blair's enthusiasm toward adopting Bush's War on Terror terminologies and supporting the Iraq War, this may be argued to be a result of an independent British foreign policy to forge a "special relationship" with the US. By becoming part of "Team America," Britain could leverage US hegemonic power to preserve its global reach and influence (Kennedy‐Pipe & Vickers, 2007). Blair's secret message to Bush: "I will be with you, whatever" (before the UN weapons inspectors completed their work regarding WMDs in Iraq), implies that the Blair administration was more driven by individual calculations and interests than the noble goals of restoring "freedom" advocated by the Bush doctrine (Booth, 2017). It may therefore be observed that the prioritisation of realist "balance of power" calculations limited even the short-run effects of the War on Terror normative framing attempt and that states were not "socialised" to accept the unilateral Bush doctrine despite the affective wave of 9/11.
Long Run: Unintended Consequences
In retrospect, it may be further argued that the War on Terror frame had contributed to growing "anti-Americanism" and declining US credibility in the international arena. On the one hand, the overly ambitious objectives of the Bush Doctrine caused the US to overpromise and underdeliver. For instance, the rise of ISIS and the recent withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan proved the failure of US-led preventative action and regime change; the fact that the US claims about Iraq WMDs were revealed to be false in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion further reconfirmed European criticisms of American unilateralism. On the other hand, the Bush doctrine could be argued to be imperialistic in its insistence on "American exceptionalism," which was ultimately incompatible with the liberal world order (Dunne & Mulaj, 2010). Dunne & Mulaj (2010) point to a "paradox of hegemony" where the US struggles to maintain global leadership by undermining the very system it claims to lead - by exempting itself from international norms and regulation when combating terrorism. The growing distrust toward US leadership is particularly evident in the emergence and popularisation of a "WMD conspiracy" that accused the Bush administration of conspiring to invade Iraq to secure its oil interests (Heide, 2013). Hence, the effects of the War on Terror frame ultimately ran contrary to its objectives, tarnishing the very American "brand" that it had sought to promote in the first place.
The US overexpansion of its circle of enemies under the "terrorist" umbrella could also be perceived to have served as a strategic straitjacket. On the one hand, by including "rogue regimes" as an enemy in the "War on Terror," the US had to discard potential allies like Iran and Syria to preserve the internal logic that it advocated (Dunn, 2005). This is although Iran and Syria, which possessed "valuable regional knowledge and influence", could have been key facilitators in the fight against al-Qaeda (ibid.). On the other hand, while the principle of "non-negotiation with terrorists" may be justified on grounds of not legitimising and further promoting terrorist acts that target the US, it may be argued that declaring “war” against all terrorists - including belligerent groups that do not directly target American interests - unnecessarily limits its negotiation and conflict resolution processes (Toros, 2008). This is supported by the delisting of Yemen's Houthis by the Biden Administration in 2021 as a "Foreign Terrorist Organisation" and as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" to enable more humanitarian aid flows into Yemen - which may suggest an implicit admission by the US that it had previously overextended its list of "terrorist" organisations under the War on Terror (Al Jazeera, 2024).
Was the US humbled by the lack of imagined success in its War on Terror? The Obama Administration eventually took steps to shift direction in discarding the War on Terror rhetoric and moving to end harsh interrogation practices (Burkeman, 2017). Yet the War on Terror lives on in constantly evolving forms - previously in the US-led coalition against ISIS and currently in Biden's covert predator drone programs (which involve targeted killings of key belligerents) (Jaigirdar, 2021). It appears that "counterterrorism" will continue to be leveraged by the US as a means to expand its global "sphere of influence" and reinforce its "primacy" in the years to come (ibid.).
