Trouble at Home: Britain’s Authoritarianism Problem

Owen Tsai is a second year Philosophy, Politics and Economics student. He currently works at Global Weekly alongside the Diplomacy Review, contributing geopolitical analysis pieces published bi-weekly. Email: owenhhtsai@gmail.com.

Introduction 

How has Labour fared since July 4th? Many are saying “not well”. An October YouGov poll shows 63% public dislike for PM Sir Keir Starmer, 59% disapproval of the new government, and 9 out of 14 key policy areas saw more than 50% respondents state that Labour has handled urgent issues “badly” [1]. But why?

The poll points to fiscal policy reasons, including the adjustment to pensioners’s winter fuel allowance and the “harsh” October budget [2]. Some are unhappy with the handling of nationwide riots in August. Some say the immigration worry has gone unaddressed. But some have levelled a more damning critique on him: authoritarianism. Aside from sporadically publicised hate speech sentences under Labour rule, there are two key political moves that detractors of Starmer point to: the pre-election “purge” of left-wing Labour members, and the suspension of 7 MPs for party-disloyal voting [3]. 

In truth, 2024 is hardly the first year that the UK has been labelled undemocratic. Neither of the last two PMs before Starmer were democratically elected, and the British governing system has sometimes been labelled an “elective dictatorship” [4], a scathing indictment that, regretfully, holds some truth. The underlying causes must be explored, if British society is to realise this ever-present problem, and fix it. 

Systematic misrepresentation

Hanna Pitkin was not the first scholar to notice the competitive relationship between democracy and representation, but she surmised the conflict succinctly. Democracy requires voter intent to be “present”; those preferences are “made present” by representatives, who may either misunderstand the wishes of their people, and/or disregard them in favour of alternative interests. Boris Johnson did not promise voters selectively applicable lockdown policy; Tony Blair was not elected to wage war a continent away, ignoring public outrage. To quote her work from 20 years ago, “the predominant result (of democratising the republic system) has been that representation has supplanted the democratic system instead of serving it” [5]. 

A pioneer in the study of political representation, Pitkin proposes four distinct varieties, of which 2 will be central to this piece: formalistic representation, and substantive representation [6]. The former, a focus of this section, refers to the presence of institutionalised mechanisms to facilitate representation in two dimensions: authorisation i.e. obtaining the status of representative, and accountability i.e. responding to those being represented [7]. Unfortunately, sufficient attention is paid to neither dimension in Britain, and this has roots in the electoral system. One such origin is the now much-contended first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. 

Also termed the plurality system, FPTP have Members of Parliament (MPs) selected by voters casting single ballots, with whoever achieving a simple majority in their respective constituency being selected into office [8]. The leader of a political party, provided that they retain their seat, is chosen as PM. The biggest gripe the public has with the system is, predictably, representation. Hypothetically, if Labour defeats the Conservatives by 100 votes in each constituency, they would comfortably enjoy a supermajority in the House of Commons, despite possibly only having 1% more votes than the Tories. While the reality is often less extreme, there is a scholarly consensus that 40% of the popular vote gifts a party a parliamentary majority [9]. The seats-to-vote-share ratios in the latest election were particularly stark: Reform UK gained 5 seats from 14% of the vote, while Labour swooped 412 from 34%. 

This is not the only way the authorisation dimension is compromised. There is a structural cause behind the historical prominence of Labour and the Tories among the electorate: FPTP supports it. Political scientist Maurice Duverger theorised that “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” [10]. The UK, being a simple-majority single-ballot democracy, have mostly adhered to what is now called Duverger’s Law, for several reasons. The majoritarian nature of FPTP allows for like-minded individuals to maximise winning chances by focusing votes on candidate groups, hence the formation of dominant parties; afterwards, voters and politicians alike align with them despite slight ideological differences, citing greater possibility of desired implementation of policies. With this, not only is the average voter never fully represented in parliament, voters with clearly divergent policy preferences compared to the median voter are completely inconsequential to the government-building process, which has been dominated by Labour and the Tories. The 2024 election is the first in a century where the combined Labour-Tory vote share has dipped under 60% [11], and the 2024 result could yet be explained by record-level dissatisfaction for the Tories, and explicit voter intent to defeat them by tactical voting [12], instead of a significant departure from Duverger’s law. 

And with large parties usually securing electoral majorities without breaking a sweat, we see the damage done to the accountability dimension. The 2010 Cameron-Clegg coalition, being the first such government since 1945 [13], had no problem tripling tuition fees despite severe backlash [14], so why would unpopular decisions made by any majority government, much less those of supermajority governments e.g. Blair’s and Starmer’s be punished? Any PM with over 325 loyal seats in parliament effectively passes any legislation they agree on, and fails any they do not. Intra-party disloyalty, a key reason for Theresa May’s exit, is thus naturally frowned upon by leaders, who may resort to dictatorial punishment and elimination like Starmer did. There is no veto power for opposition parties, nevermind an opinionated British public, who often resort to protest.

Press, un-press and repeat

In September 2022, Liz Truss became prime minister. What came after was a series of financial policy decisions that led to her downfall [15]. Obviously, most of the public, who did not fancy unfunded tax-cuts-induced economic turmoil, did not call for them. Accountable representation has failed again. A lack of power for the British populace in policymaking is apparent, which brings us to another systematic weakness of UK politics: little substantive representation. 

The term refers to the representation of interests that those being represented hold. While representative democracy supporters have always claimed that elected politicians facilitate sufficient inclusion of popular opinion into the policymaking process, despised policies have time and time again come into effect. One such was austerity, commonly associated with David Cameron and 2010s Conservative rule. Surveys say over 60% of the public have worried about directly suffering from spending cuts on public services from 2010 to 2013 [16]. 2018 polls show that two-thirds of Britons, including Tory voters, think that austerity has gone too far [17]. This did not stop austerity until the latest October Budget, which some describe as having a different approach [18]. 

The established central mechanism for voters to engage with national policy discussion and formation continues to be the vote itself, and not impactful dialogue between the people and lawmakers. Party stances are only determined by their voter base and source of income, hence why austerity that disproportionately affects the poor is less risky for Cameron than taxing top-bracket earners more. Even then, they are only held accountable during elections: the public have no influential voice in policymaking; courting civilian bodies without giving them a say in lawmaking does not count. This hole in substantive representation may explain why V-Dem ranks Britain as less of a participatory democracy than Uruguay, Taiwan or Italy [19].

While in-party backlash was a significant driver in Truss’s collapse [20], her woes show that extreme unpopularity has consequences, and should be avoided if one seeks stable governance. In such potential instances, the media fills the role of party-loyal safety nets. To oversimplify the complex, far-reaching power of media, by selectively publishing information and controlling the agenda of discourse, they mould public opinion to support favoured politicians and policies. Research has shown media influence on public attitudes towards austerity [21], but a more acute example of “opinion manufacturing” is the Brexit Referendum, when eurosceptic tabloids skyrocketed Leave campaign coverage, which increased public concerns with immigration by 10% before the vote [22]. By using the trust between reader and publication to sway public opinion, averting opposition to policy decisions in the process, voter interests that enable the election of officials make way for party objectives again. In addition, ideological polarisation caused by the British press leaves little room for citizens to discuss politics and come to common ground, which eliminates the already limited possibility of public deliberation shaping policy. The cycle of media swaying voters, voters electing politicians and politicians empowering media allows a fundamentally under-representative democracy to go unchallenged. 

Epilogue

Unfortunately, the UK is not the only democracy where the populace feels disenfranchised, and authoritarianism rears its head. In France, President Emmanuel Macron and the previous Ensemble government have invoked Article 49.3 to force through legislation at an alarming frequency [23]. In the US, Duverger’s law holds firm as the American Left continues to go unrepresented [24]. And across the Western world, we see a resurgence of right-wing populism vying for power with traditional parties, backed by powerful publications. As worldwide democratic backsliding continues, and the international world order shifts towards a more Westphalian direction, a possible diplomatic outcome could be the emergence of new oppressive models of governance in the West, and its tolerance and encouragement by fellow autocratic nations. 

Democracy is as much of a core British value as it is fragile. Some Britons have long realised this; some have given up on it. But what we can do is organise and speak in unity, to suggest improvements in our system, to voice our opinion and push for reform, and to cherish the vote. At these trying times for democracy internationally, it is more important than ever for the people to fight for governance that is of it, by it and for it.

Works Cited

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[2] Sky News (2024). Budget will embrace ‘harsh light of fiscal reality’, Sir Keir Starmer to say. [online] Sky News. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/budget-will-embrace-harsh-light-of-fiscal-reality-sir-keir-starmer-to-say-13243150.

[3] Baker, T. (2024). Starmer suspends seven MPs who rebelled over two-child benefit cap. [online] Sky News. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/labour-suspend-seven-mps-who-rebelled-over-two-child-benefit-cap-13183879.

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