United Nations Resolution 2758 and Taiwan’s Diplomatic Prospect
Shun-Hsing Chou
Shun-Hsing Chou is a second-year BSc Politics and International Relations student. His primary areas of focus include international conflicts, and a geopolitical interest In ROC (Taiwan).
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognise the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organisations related to it.
In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate representative of China in the UN (United Nations General Assembly, 1971). This pivotal decision led to the exclusion of the Republic of China (ROC), commonly known as Taiwan, from the international body. Over half a century later, the resolution remains a cornerstone of the "One China" policy that many nations adhere to. However, the geopolitical landscape has significantly evolved since then, rendering UN Resolution 2758 an obsolete document that no longer effectively addresses the complexities of the current geopolitical situation, but a tool that the PRC uses to achieve its diplomatic goals.
Historical Context
To understand the obsolescence of Resolution 2758, it is essential to consider its historical context. After World War II, China was embroiled in a civil war between the Nationalist government (Kuomintang or KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC). By 1949, the CPC had established control over mainland China, proclaiming the PRC, while the KMT retreated to Taiwan, continuing to operate as the ROC government (Fenby, 2008; Taylor, 2009). This resulted in two separate governments each claiming to be the legitimate representative of China. During the Cold War, global politics heavily influenced international recognition. The United States and its allies initially supported the ROC as part of their strategy to contain communism (Garver, 1997). However, by the late 1960s, many countries began to recognise the PRC due to its growing geopolitical importance and the desire for diplomatic and economic engagement (Foot, 1995).
The shift culminated in the adoption of UN Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971, which recognised the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China in the UN and expelled the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from their seats (United Nations General Assembly, 1971). Notably, the resolution did not address the status of Taiwan or its people directly, focusing solely on the issue of Chinese representation in the UN. In the immediate aftermath, Taiwan lost its UN seat and was excluded from all affiliated organisations, leading to significant international isolation (Copper, 2019). Many countries adopted the “One China” policy, establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC and severing official ties with the ROC to avoid diplomatic repercussions. At the time, the resolution was seen as a necessary adjustment to reflect the geopolitical realities of the era.
The Obsolescence of the Resolution to the Republic of China (Taiwan)
As mentioned, Resolution 2758 does not specifically mention Taiwan, Formosa, or its affiliated islands (United Nations General Assembly, 1971). Today, Taiwan, as the main territory governed by the ROC, has evolved into a vibrant democracy with its own elections, military, currency, and government (Rigger, 2011). This development reflects how the ROC has integrated into Taiwanese society, fostering a distinct Taiwanese identity (Wachman, 1994). This identity increasingly contrasts with the original stance of the ROC, which once claimed to be the legitimate ruler of all of China (Roy, 2003).
In 1971, when the ROC was replaced by the PRC in the United Nations, the ROC did not yet embody this emerging Taiwanese identity. At that time, it participated in the UN as the representative of China. As a result, Resolution 2758 did not explicitly address Taiwan’s status, as the international community generally viewed Taiwan as a territory of China, regardless of which government held the seat at the UN (Bush, 2013).
To the Republic of China, this resolution signifies the decline of its diplomatic status, and to Taiwan, it means that it can never be part of the international society because it is being covered with a shell, and a burden, named the Republic of China (Chou, 2014).
In contemporary times, the resolution is factually obsolete because it only stops the operation of the Republic of China in the UN framework but does not hinder the international recognition of Taiwan. Nowadays, most countries in the world establish representative offices as their diplomatic institutions in Taipei (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), n.d.). Taiwan, with its advanced capacity in semiconductors, healthcare, manufacturing, and information technology, is becoming an important player in the international community (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, n.d.). As the Taiwanese identity becomes mainstream, this resolution becomes more insignificant because it does not hinder the territory that constitutes 99% of the Republic of China from participating in commerce, security, academic, and other multilateral relationships outside of the UN framework (deLisle & Goldstein, 2019).
Secondly, for the Republic of China—or any state, for that matter—losing UN membership does not equate to losing its legal existence or diplomatic standing. According to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a state’s legitimacy is grounded in its population, territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933). One might ask: If the United Nations did not exist, would countries cease to exist? Alternatively, were all states before 1945, when the UN was not established, illegitimate? These rhetorical questions underscore the notion that a country’s legitimacy does not depend on UN membership. In the case of the Republic of China, this perspective renders the resolution governing its UN participation increasingly irrelevant (Chen, 2017).
In the 2000s, the government of the ROC recognised this perspective and initiated a new era of diplomacy characterised by unconventional, unofficial, and peaceful approaches to engaging with the international community, including the PRC (Huang, 2011). This strategy aimed to resolve tensions, build relationships, and maintain a degree of international presence despite the limitations imposed by the PRC's diplomatic influence. However, despite these efforts, the deliberate avoidance of UN Resolution 2758 by the ROC did not result in formal diplomatic recognition, as most countries continued to acknowledge the framework established by the resolution. Consequently, this framework has become even more critical for the PRC, as it reinforces their claim to sole representation and continues to shape the diplomatic landscape (Hickey, 2007).
The Importance of the Resolution to the People’s Republic of China
Alternatively, Resolution 2758 serves as a key source of Beijing’s legitimacy to govern both China and Taiwan (Kan, 2011). There are two primary reasons why the PRC seeks to claim Taiwan, and these reasons also parallel its broader participation in the United Nations.
In the context of Chinese history and culture, as articulated by thinkers like Liang Qichao, regimes like the PRC lack full political legitimacy to rule China if they did not receive an official transition of power from their predecessors, and the previous "dynasty"—the ROC—continues to exist in Taiwan (Wang, 2004; Lu, 2006). Under this view, the PRC is seen merely as a "partial" ruler, governing only part of China. With this historical and cultural backdrop, the PRC must find ways to demonstrate to its citizens that it is the rightful authority over all of China and is committed to preserving the nation’s territorial integrity (Zheng, 1999). By claiming Taiwan or attempting to unify it with the mainland—whether by force or through peaceful means—the PRC justifies its governance and bolsters its legitimacy. This claim also serves as a distraction, rallying domestic support and shifting focus away from economic challenges or social unrest (Shirk, 2007). Occupying Taiwan would effectively end the existence of the ROC, completing the political transition from the Qing Dynasty, to the Republic of China, and finally to the People’s Republic of China. From the aforementioned ethical-political perspective, this would symbolise the culmination of power consolidation, validating the PRC’s rule not just over mainland China, but all territories historically associated with it (Zhao, 2013).
By asserting its legitimacy in the UN, the PRC has the leverage to maintain its narrative with both motives: denying the existence of the Republic of China and claiming Taiwan as part of its territory (Swaine, 2011).
Recent Developments on the Resolution and Diplomatic Prospects
As global circumstances have evolved, the PRC has emerged as a formidable geopolitical challenger to the United States (Mearsheimer, 2014). In response, the U.S. has increasingly prioritised stability, security, and prosperity in strategic regions such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait (U.S. Department of Defense, 2021). Furthermore, a growing number of countries in Asia and Europe have begun to reconsider their previously accommodating stance toward the PRC and are now contemplating alliances aimed at counterbalancing its influence (Economy, 2018).
In this context, the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) was established in 2020. It consists of representatives from multiple countries, including the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom, each represented by members of their respective parliaments. The alliance seeks to develop comprehensive policies to counter the PRC in areas such as diplomacy, human rights, environmental protection, and energy policy (Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, n.d.-b). Naturally, the ROC, under the name Taiwan, has become an integral part of this initiative (Cole, 2020). In July 2024, IPAC passed a resolution that unequivocally clarified the alliance’s stance on UN Resolution 2758, asserting that the resolution does not reference Taiwan. The alliance further argued that the PRC has consistently misinterpreted the resolution to legitimise its efforts to limit Taiwan’s international participation and justify the potential use of military force against Taiwan (Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, 2024). Following IPAC’s resolution, both the Australian Senate and the Dutch Parliament overwhelmingly passed similar motions, advocating for a reassessment of Resolution 2758 and condemning its misuse.
However, the support of international allies alone is insufficient. Political parties in the ROC must set aside their hesitancy and formally recognise that the ROC functions as the de facto governing authority of Taiwan, while realising that the prospect of peaceful and dignified unification with the PRC is increasingly remote (Bush & Kastner, 2019). Given the vast disparity in size and power between Taiwan and the PRC, the possibility and PRC’s inclination towards negotiation is nearly zero. For the long-term prosperity of Taiwan and the stability of the ROC, it is imperative that the Taiwanese government adopts a decisive stance, demonstrates resolve, and cooperates closely with like-minded international allies (Sutter, 2017).
