War Communism: From Bolshevik Russia to Modern Battlegrounds
Riya Hari is a first-year History, Politics & Economics student at UCL, hoping to specialise in Economics. www.linkedin.com/in/riya-hari-b4a801243
Introduction:
The onset of the Russian Civil War of 1917-1922 saw the imposition of the policy we term today as War Communism. War Communism may be characterised by three distinct facets: state control of the economy, forced requisitioning of foodstuffs and the intense socio-economic strain that came with sustaining production in the face of conflict. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the last vestige of global Communism faded. Yet, the legacy of War Communism endures, not through explicit Bolshevik characteristics but through policies that resemble the Communist system’s resource allocation and socio-economic strategies during wartime. In particular, this report shall weave together the threads of history, politics & economics through a comparative analysis of the Syrian and Ukrainian conflict— assessing the humanitarian impact of their wartime policies from the Soviet era to the present day. Conducting a policy analysis of the aforementioned countries with an interdisciplinary approach as such is particularly useful in enabling a multifaceted understanding of the humanitarian implications wartime economies have in both the short term across social, economic and political dimensions.
A Brief Overview of War Communism & the New Economic Policy (NEP):
In June 1918, the Bolshevik government imposed the policy of War Communism on Red Army-controlled territories during the Russian Civil War. The move signalled a shift from a market economy to a command economy, for it involved the nationalisation of large-scale industry, the abolition of private markets and the forcible requisitioning of surplus grain from peasants. A further dimension of War Communism surrounds how, in an attempt to centralise the Soviet economy further, money was largely replaced by a system of state rationing. The consequences were devastating, for an already war-torn Russia was plunged into further socio-economic chaos. Agricultural production plummeted and food scarcity worsened as farmers only produced enough for their sustenance to avoid state seizure of surplus (Ray, 2023).
Similarly, industrial output fell by 82% in the years 1918-1921 compared to 1913— the last year of peace before the First World War. By 1920, this combination of war, famine, and socio-economic strain plunged Russia into crisis, with millions affected by food scarcity. In addition to war, Russia was facing famine as the Bolshevik regime continued to maintain that this was the result of farmers’ alleged lack of cooperation with War Communism. The seeds of social protest had been sown, and widespread unrest would soon emerge, from the countryside to the ranks of disillusioned soldiers and workers.
In rural regions, peasants organised against the forced requisitioning that came alongside War Communism, culminating in the Tambov Rebellion— a revolt that was brutally suppressed by Red Army troops. Sailors at the Kronstadt Naval base joined forces with urban workers to form the Revolutionary Committee. They aimed to protest against Red Army policies, for it was in their view that the Bolshevik regime had betrayed the very form of socialism that they once fought to uphold. The Kronstadt Uprising fell after a combined assault by the Red Army and Cheka—Soviet secret police units on its 15,000 defenders. Following the Bolshevik victory, the survivors of the mutiny were treated mercilessly. Yet, one thing remained clear: These events underscored the widespread rejection of War Communism and forced the Bolshevik leadership to confront the unsustainability of their economic strategy.
Thus, in an equally controversial move back to a market economy, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was put forth to replace food requisitioning with a tax in kind. Once paid, peasants were permitted to sell surplus grain in the market, providing much-needed relief and incentive for agricultural production (Goodlad, Walsh-Atkins and Williams, 2019, pp.189–193).
Wartime Policy in Syria:
The Syrian Civil War brought about intensive state centralisation reminiscent of Soviet-era tactics. However, its implementation differs, for the war has been waged not in isolation but rather through a unique context of proxy warfare and foreign intervention. Assad’s wartime economy has been structured such that he holds a tight grip on Syrian business, dismantling independent entities perceived as disloyal. Another motive behind centralisation lies in its ability to mitigate the impact of foreign sanctions. Case in point: when Assad’s cousin Rami Makhloufresisted contributing his assets to the Assad regime, his economic holdings were systematically disassembled and reallocated to regime loyalists. However, Assad was not acting to manage scarcity, but rather to further consolidate his power and quash any threats to his rule. Similarly, the Red Army used War Communism as a tactic to build resilience at a time when it sustained serious losses against the Whites; their opponents during the Russian Civil War (Shaar and Heydemann, 2024).
A further dimension of Assad’s centralisation of essential resources such as foodstuffs during periods of conflict too, must be considered. It lies in the coercive requisitioning and rationing of necessity goods to subjugate opposing territories. This weaponisation of foodstuffs was coined the ‘kneel and starve’ strategy. The nationalisation of essential resources such as fuel and wheat, deprived rebel-held territories and starved out Assad’s opposition (Starvation Accountability, 2022). Reports emphasize that militias and groups allied with Assad, such as the Druze fighters in As-Sweida, hoard essential resources, further straining opposition regions and impoverishing local civilians (COAR, 2020b).
Sporadic moments of civil unrest against the Assad regime in Damascus mirrors the Soviet experience. Assad’s brutal crackdown on dissent through his ‘kneel and starve’ strategy serves to resemble the Tambov rebellion, which too, was suppressed through a series of similar tactics. The key lies in not just resource deprivation but also militarised repression; just as War Communism was enforced in Tambov through bloody military campaigns, any opposition to Assad’s regime was also quashed through the bombing of rebel-held territories. Thus, a combination of centralisation and military repression consolidated the power of the Soviet and Assad regimes (COAR, 2020b) (Goodlad, Walsh-Atkins and Williams, 2019, pp.189–193).
One observes an exponential increase in poverty in Syria and loss of household welfare, further aggravated by government cuts in transfer payments. What makes the consequences of wartime policy in Syria different from Civil War-era Russia, however, is the rise of the informal economy. As essential military and government projects were prioritised, human capital suffered the effects of extreme poverty and shortages of necessary goods (COAR, 2020a). The suffering of the people somewhat mirrors the Soviet experience, yet differs from it in several aspects. The difference lies particularly in the existence of partial centralisation, and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
Wartime Policy in Ukraine:
A comparison between Ukrainian strategy and War Communism is far more nuanced as it emphasises a distinction between resilience and international cooperation in the former and autarky and isolationism in the latter. In line with Soviet policy, Ukraine centralised its fiscal policy on defence, with military spending assuming greater importance than civilian welfare. However, what sets the Ukrainian example apart is the existence of foreign aid flowing into the country, and the resources of that being allocated towards the citizenry. Ultimately, this means the absence of absolute poverty and acute food shortages associated with Syria and Bolshevik Russia (Centre for Economic Strategy, 2023).
The sole example of nationalisation in Ukraine concerns its energy resources to sustain the economy. Unlike the Bolshevik policy of autarky and isolationism, Ukraine strategically balances its centralisation through its alliance with the European Union (EU), allowing any imports of vital resources amid times of scarcity. International partnerships as such ensure a steady stream of critical supplies that would otherwise be rendered unavailable during times of conflict (Dickinson, 2024).
Finally, sustained public morale remains a stark contrast between modern-day Ukraine and Bolshevik Russia. With the repressive nature of War Communism came protests such as in Tambov and Kronstadt (Goodlad, Walsh-Atkins and Williams, 2019, pp.189–193). At the same time, Ukraine’s reliance on internationalism cites the prevalence of foreign trade in ensuring its survival as a nation during wartime, particularly in terms of foreign trade as a means of economic stability, and rallying public support for Zelensky’s regime (Clem, Herron and Hoheneder, 2023).
Concluding Statements:
The collapse of the Soviet Union may have signalled the end of global communism, but its legacy remains in today’s wartime economies. War Communism put in place the framework for any nation-state to prolong the conflict. Yet, its implementation today is more complex and remains influenced by the onset of globalisation and political dynamics. For Assad, centralisation associated with War Communism was a means through which he could ensure the survival of his authoritarian regime. On the other hand, a combination of centralisation and international trade has sustained Ukrainian morale and economic normalcy following the Russian assault. Ultimately, one can conclude that wartime economies are moulded through historical legacies and modern alliances. While socio-economic repression is consistent, Ukraine serves to stand out from the crowd, highlighting the complexity of international cooperation and how it can make—or break a nation’s fundamental capacity to survive war.
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